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ABSTRACT
Sign-sentence theory is developed, as a translating and 
decoding method for nonverbal communication. The theory 
incorporates those of White <1982> and Carroll (1986), and 
draws support from Vygotsky (1934/1962). White’s theory 
parallels the phases of development of human infants with 
other mammalians providing a phylogenetic origin of 
communication. Carroll’s theory shows congruence in the 
communication of infants and gives evidence of the 
translating of nonverbal statements to verbal statements by 
the child him/herself in development. This translating 
technique is presented with the socio—historical support of 
Vygotsky’s theory (1934/1962) and the linguistic research of 
Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff (1991) as evidence to support the 
decoding of samples of nonverbal communication of children. 
Three studies are provided: one preschool laboratory 
observational study; one decoding study of a nonverbal dance 
in a children’s reading group recorded by McDermott, 
Gospodinoff, and Aron (1981); and one adult-infant 
interaction recorded by Braunwald (1983). This new theory 
brings insight to the origin of communication and language. 
It can provide an efficient decoding device for researchers 
in the field of communication and related fields who study 
child 1anguage.
INTRODUCTION
Studies of children’s development of language (from 
one—word utterances to complicated sentences) have filled 
the research literature since Noam Chomsky (1957) 
revolutionized the study of syntax. The studies of apes 
(e.g., Leiberman, 1984), the support for "critical periods” 
for language development (e.g., Curtiss, 1977), and the 
studies of right and left brain activity (e.g.,Henry, 1985) 
support the premise that the period before puberty is 
critical for acquiring verbal language which is lateralized 
in the brain’s left hemisphere. Institutionalized children 
(Provence & Lipton, 1962), like Genie (Curtiss, 1977), the 
girl who was isolated and tied to a chair most of her life, 
suffer a lack of language development which reveals the 
necessity of both social interaction (nonverbal 
communication or right brain functioning) (Henry, 1985) and 
a speech environment (left-brain functioning). These 
factors point to the triggering action of experience 
advanced by Chomsky (Reiber, 1983) and others.
It appears that nonverbal communication, beginning 
with the mother’s initiation toward the child (White, 1982), 
is developed and lateralized in the right brain (Henry,
1985) where verbal language follows (Curtiss, 1977;
Lieberman, 1984; Pines, 1981). Because of a triggering 
effect from the language environment (Chomsky, 1976;
Reiber, 1983) and the renegotiating phase of development 
(White, 1982), the control of speech is switched from the 
right to the left hemisphere of the brain which is already 
lateralized for human speech sounds in infancy (Henry,
1985). Perhaps Chomsky's (1976) Language Acquisition Device 
is merely this switch in hemispheric brain control.
Burgoon, Buller, and Woodal (1989) propose that "... we 
may learn some things by studying nonhuman interactions and 
we will not hesitate to draw on these observations where 
they serve as useful illustrations or analogues." White
(1982) proposed a set of such analogues in her phase theory. 
White's phase theory provides a foundation for the claim 
that nonverbal communication is basic and vital to the 
development of verbal communication. Research by Carroll
(1986) provides the developmental detail concerning how
nonverbal communication expands to verbal. This research 
creates a new perspective of children's language and 
communication development which has formerly focused 
centrally on verbal language. The Language Acquisition 
Device of Chomsky and the triggering action of the language 
environment explained by Chomsky (Reiber, 1983) leave much 
to be accounted for. White's (1982) theory provides a new 
approach to understanding human communication from an 
ethological background which holds nonverbal communication 
in a primary position in communication and language 
development.
Purpose
It appears that nonverbal communication holds a 
secondary role not only in communication research, but in 
linguistic studies and psychological literature. For 
instance, crawling infants may look at their parents for 
signals of approval before continuing into a questionable 
area: such an episode is listed under "Developmental
Behavior” in a child psychology text CHetherington & Parke,
1986), but there is no mention that a message is sent by the 
child or the parent, or that communication takes place. A 
case study by Goode (1990) shows through long-term, in—home 
observations that nonverbal communication practices take 
place between parents and their blind and deaf child. 
Previous professional assessments of the parents who claimed 
that their child communicated with them were that the 
parents were delusional. The study concludes that 
professional models of communication employed in language 
assessment fail to comprehend the basic descriptive elements 
of familial communication. White’s (1982) theory could 
bring new insights to nonverbal communication as well as 
verbal exchange.
This dissertation incorporates the theory of White
(1982) and the theory of Carroll (1986) into a theory of 
sentence-signs which I have developed. I will show that 
much communication takes place in childhood nonverbally 
which constitutes clear, adequate, and expressive message-
sending and message—receiving. For Instance, a 30-month-oId 
child who intends to send the message, "Daddy is not at 
home," (which is a negative transformation from the positive 
version in adult language) may say, "Da da home," and shake 
his/her head back and forth incorporating the verbal and 
nonverbal language into one statement. Or a nine-month old 
child who sees some ice cream that he/she wants may extend
both arms toward an ice cream cone since s/he cannot send
such a message verbally. We will see further explanation of 
such an episode later in the Braunwald (1983) Study. Other 
examples are shown in the laboratory observational study of 
children two to five years old. Preschool children and 
infants do send messages according to their level of 
development just as adults do; however, they generally are
not acknowledged as communicators. Their communication is
not an outstanding focus of the study of child development. 
Crain (1992), an authoritative resource for recent graduate 
studies in child development, makes no mention of 
communication. Even in Crain’s (1992) discussion of the 
issue of forming negatives in childhood as seen in the first 
example above, the option of nonverbal statements is not 
considered. In discussing research by Klima & Bellugi 
(1966), Crain states:
Initially children act as if their rule is:
Put the negative in front of the whole sentence 
(or after it). For example, they say "No play
that.” ”No want stand head.” and "Car go no.”
A bit later children seem to form a new 
rule: Put the negative after the first noun
phrase and before everything else. They say 
things like, "He no bite you.” and ” I no 
want envelope."’ (p.308)
In Crain's (1992) discussion, there is no 
acknowledgment of the other option of forming the negative 
with nonverbal head movement. The child's use of nonverbal 
head movement is probably evidence that the transformation 
is indeed internalized, but is only beginning to develop in 
its spoken form.
A second objective of the presentation of sign-sentence 
theory is to show that through innate comprehension of 
nonverbal statements and verbal language structure, the 
competence of message identification and message sending, 
even in the prelinguistic child, may be translated into 
simple sentences by adults. The innate comprehension of 
language has been theorized as intuitive knowledge by 
Chomsky (1957), as the basis for Transformational Grammar. 
This comprehension in infants will be demonstrated in 
the Preferential Looking Paradign of Hirsh-Pasek and 
Golinkoff (1991) where infants match behavioral display to 
verbal descriptions of televized images.
Translating nonverbal behavior into simple sentences 
will expand the details of language development in childhood
to include nonverbal behavior and identify nonverbal 
behavior as the originating predessessor of verbal language.
The third and final objective of sign-sentence theory 
is to provide a foundation from early childhood for later 
development in communication. By using the innate verbal 
knowledge as a translating device of nonverbal expressions 
to verbal ones, researchers may then expand transformations 
of this simple sentence to more complicated ones to embody 
all nonverbal expression as has already been done for verbal 
expression (Chomsky, 1957). These new transformations for 
nonverbal language may incorporate meanings which have 
already been identified in the area of nonverbal 
communication and should also include new meaning which have 
here-to-fore been uuaccessible.
Intention
Intention to communicate specific meaning to another is 
an important issue in much communication research.
In discussing intentionality, Knapp and Hall (1992) 
state :
Sometimes we design a message very carefully and the 
other person does not get it; sometimes we do things we 
are not even aware of and other people respond as if 
we had deliberately designed the behavior to evoke 
a particular response. = (p. 8)
Knapp and Hall then offer MacKay’s (1972) model which 
proposes four types of intentionality for nonverbal signals:
(a) goal directed interpreted as goal directed; (b) goal 
directed not interpreted as goal directed; (c) non-goal 
directed interpreted as goal directed; (d) non-goal directed 
not interpreted as goal directed. Knapp and Hall (1992) 
cite MacKay <1972,p.24):
Situations of these four types may be expected 
to differ radically both in their dynamics and in the 
categories of scientific explanation that they will 
demand in order to be fully understood. It seems 
important that experiments on non-verbal 
“communication” should be designed as far as 
possible to distinguish between them, (see Footnote 2) 
Distinguishing between intentional or goal directed 
behavior and unintentional or non-goal directed behavior 
according to sign-sentence theory would apply only insofar 
as one member may signal another as to the contextual format 
for their interactional behavior. Bruner (1983) uses the 
term ”intention” in this way as does Savage-Rumbaugh (1991). 
Such exchanges identified as involving at least two 
individuals encountering one another in a format or routine 
will be described below by Bruner (1983) and Savage-Rumbaugh 
(1991). Sign-sentence theory views the behavior in such 
routines as nonverbal language, and just as intention is 
assumed in verbal language (that if a person is speaking, he 
or she intends to send a verbal message), so also can we 
assume intention in nonverbal language. Intention is really
8not an Issue in sign-sentence theory since it does not 
exclude any behavior found in the interactional format, as 
described below in the structural definitions of 
communication in Birdwhistell*s and Scheflin’s theories. 
Intention can be an issue only if some behaviors are to be 
excluded from analysis as communication because some 
behaviors are not considered to be intentional 
communication. However, Sign-sentence theory includes all 
behavior in the format. The only intention required is the 
intention to signal the format which is the beginning of the 
interactional process.
McDermott, Gospodinoff, & Aron (1981) explain this:
People manage to know for sure what is going 
on only in relation to specific interactional 
environments, and they usually know a great deal about 
these environments because they have helped to 
construct them as predictable contexts for plying 
whatever it is that they know. Such framing takes 
considerable work, and it is by that work that we are 
able to locate what it is that members of a group 
are up to at any given time.
Members usually reference or in some way formulate 
some of the contexts for their behavior...
In addition to naming, a context can be formulated by a 
statement of what is required of a member in a 
particular context. For example, the structure of a
classroom reading lesson can be formulated by the 
teacher calling on a child to read or by a child 
complaining that he never gets a turn...
On occasion, a gesture can stand on its own as the 
sole signal for a prolonged context. The condition 
for the description of any signal as a feature of the 
work members do to contextualize each other is that 
it is responded to; that is, upon signaling the members 
act as if the signaled context was in fact the reality 
at hand, be it accepted or challenged. => (p. 378-379) 
Bruner, as will be seen, ascribes intention to the child who 
initiates a format such as peek-a-boo, and Savage-Rumbaug 
does the same with young apes in their routines. Therefore, 
the only intention neccessary to this type of structural 
communication would be to initiate, accommodate, or 
challenge the goals of the format, routine, or program.
These are public intentions There may be other cognitive 
intentions of the participants, but Sign-sentence theory 
cannot be held accountable for such intentions since they 
are not public. The other question concerning intention is 
whether or not newborn infants possess the conscious 
awareness to understand interaction and its goals in 
formats. Bruner, as we shall see, expresses a belief that 
infants have an innate sense of intei— subjectivity. Sign- 
sentence theory takes the position that this innateness is 
part of the deep structural intuitive knowledge with which
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each child is born and, therefore, assumes the conscious 
awareness necessary to enter into formats with interactional 
goals. In this latter case, intention, again, is not an 
issue.
It may be that some nonverbal messages are merely 
informative or even unimportant to the goals of the routine, 
but if we consider the total exchanges a part of a system 
accomplishing the goals of the routine itself, it must be 
understood that if any part is excluded, it may change the 
rest of the system. It seems critical not to exclude any 
parts of it.
Kendon (1972) reviews the systemic perception of 
communication by Birdwhistell (1970):
Birdwhistell is interested in the phenomena of 
face-to-face communication in people. He is 
interested in the order or pattern that can be 
observed in the ways in which people relate their 
behavior to one another when they are in each other's 
presence. For him this order or pattern "is” 
communication: "when we talk about communication. . . 
we discuss it as a complex and sustaining system 
through which various members of the society 
interrelate with more or less efficiency and facility" 
(p.12). The aim of a science of human communication, 
in his view, would be the systematic description of 
the systems of behavior by which this interrelatedness
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is brought about. For Birdwhistell, thus, 
communication is not something that we may or may not 
achieve; it is not something that we may or may not do 
of our own choosing, for whenever we are in the 
presence of another, to the extent that there is an 
interrelation between our behavior and that of the 
other, to this extent communication is going on...
For Birdwhistell, communication is to be viewed as 
a system with a structure that can be described 
independently of the behavior of particular 
participants...
By this systemic view of communication, anything 
that anyone does in the presence of another must be 
considered as potentially part of the system. Speech 
and gesture, posture and orientation, touch and 
relative position in space— all must be taken into 
account if we are to comprehend communication. Ve 
cannot at the outset of our investigations decide not 
to attend to certain aspects of behavior. So long as 
it is detectable by the other, it must be presumed 
communicative until proven otherwise.^ (p.442)
Kendon uses the term "interrelationship" instead of 
context or format. The contextual structure of 
communication is viewed by Scheflen (1968) as "programs." 
Scheflen explains the identification of programs:
It is when you have watched the stream of behavior 30,
12
50, or more times that the pattern will begin to be 
evident. Dozens of microbehaviors will be seen to 
recur in the same sequence, and the sequence 
as a whole will be repeated.
There will not emerge a single pattern, but 
patterns of pattern. Your problem in recording will 
not be lack of order, but great complexity.
The units are found to form a hierarchy of levels of 
integration in a stream of behavior; that is, small 
units are lawfully put together with other units to 
form larger units, and these in turn form even 
larger units. The complexity is reduced to a 
unity when it has been shown how all of these 
units come together in a single configuration, 
like baby bathing. ,. Fortunately, people, whether 
they know it or not, signal each terminus to a 
stage and each beginning of the next (Harris, 1952; 
Scheflen, 1964), so we can cross-check the shift points 
in our structural analysis.
The properties of such a diagram are programmatic. 
They have implicit coded instruction, for those who 
know the interaction, equivalent to "After this is 
done, do that.” And they have alternatives or 
branching possibilities, such as "if so and so 
happens, shift to format so and so." If, for example, 
it begins to rain at a picnic there are traditional
13
alternatives for continuing. If the business meeting 
is to be followed by a speaker, the short form of the 
meeting is used. After the baby has been dried, the 
mother shifts to activities for dressing him and, 
depending on whether the contingencies call for 
taking him out or putting him to bed, the dressing 
activities vary accordingly. We can speak, then, of 
the interaction having a "program.”® (p.45-46)
Different theorists have focused on the process of 
structuring interaction in different ways, but we can see in 
each one that the interactants understand what they are 
doing together. We can see, for instance, in the children’s 
reading group of McDermott et al. (1981), which will be 
analyzed later into sign-sentences, how the children orient 
to one another on a moment-to-moment basis, holding one 
another accountable and creating the working consensus for 
the context of the reading group. McDermott et al. (1981) 
comment :
The term "working consensus” was originally used by 
Goff man (1959: 9-10) to refer to a ’’kind of interactional 
’modus vivendi.’ Together the participants contribute 
to a single overall definition of the situation which 
involves not so much a real agreement as to what 
exists but rather a real agreement as to whose claims 
concerning what issues will be temporarily honored.”
The term has been used by Kendon (1976:322) in much
14
the same way we have been using it: "A central
problem in the investigation of interaction...will 
be to see how, in terms of the functioning of 
observable behavior, the ’working consensus’ for 
a given behavioral system is established and 
maintained. In particular, this means that we must 
identify those aspects of behavioral function which 
serve to control or regulate the behavior of the 
participants in relation to the currently established 
pattern of relationship. This requires that we look 
for regularities in behavioral relationship, but that 
we look closely at places where these regularities 
change.” (p.396-397) (See Footnote 3)
Leeds-Hurwitz, Sigman, & Sullivan (1995, p.173) report 
the evaluation of the structural approach in the theory of 
Garfinkel.
Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology eschews 
grammatical or rules investigations, emphasizing 
instead the transcontextual interpretive procedures 
employed by collectivity members as part of making 
sense of action around them. Garfinkel rejected rules 
as an a priori explanation of human conduct because 
this would require a view of persons as ’’judgmental 
dopes” wired to behave in certain ways, but unable to 
make determinations that would fit rules to particular 
circumstances.
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However, Leeds-Hurwitz et al. (1995) admit that they do 
acknowledge the value of programs or rule-based 
explanations:
Ve contend that descriptions of programs provide 
valuable sociocultural insights, but that students 
of communication must examine the process by which 
program resources find their way into performance, 
and not stop at a description of the program.^ (p.173) 
Bruner (1983) has investigated how programs find their 
way into the interactive performance of a human child, 
although he chooses to use the term format instead of 
program. He defines the format;
A format is a rule—bound microcosm in which the adult 
and the child do things to and with each other. In 
its most general sense, it is the instrument of 
patterned human interaction. It is of particular 
importance to us at this point since formats are 
established between infant and caretaker before 
lexico-grammatical speech begins, and they provide 
the framing context into which language is 
introduced...(There are) three forms of reciprocal 
commitment in "pragmatic interaction:’’ (1) relating 
to the future and to signalling and acknowledging 
intention; (2) to the present that is deictic; and 
(3) to the past that is presuppositional. They 
provide a useful set of rubrics for considering
16
what is meant by a format.
A format formally entails a contingent 
interaction between at least two acting parties, 
contingent in the sense that the response of "each" 
member can be shown to be dependent upon a prior 
response of the "other.” Each member of the minimal 
pair has a goal and a set of means for its attainment 
such that two conditions are met: first, that a 
participant's successive responses are instrumental 
to that goal, and second, that there is a discernible 
stop order in the sequence indicating that the 
terminal goal has been reached. The goal of the two 
participants need not be the same; all that is required 
is that the conditions of intra-individual and intei—  
individual response contingency be fulfilled. Formats 
defined formally in this sense represent the simplest 
instance of what Schank and Abelson (1977) 
characterize as a "scenario." Formats, however,
"grow" and can become as varied as the scenarios 
described by those authors. Their growth is effected 
in several ways. They may in time incorporate 
new means or strategies for the attainment of goals 
of two partners not only in the sense of 
"agreement" but also with respect to a division 
of labor and a division of initiative. And they may 
become conventionalized or canonical in a fashion
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that permits others within a symbolic commnnity (e.g., 
a "speech community") to enter the format without 
special instruction...The creation of higher order 
formats by incorporation of subroutine formats is 
one of the principal sources of presupposition.
What is incorporated becomes implicit or presupposed.
Formats, except when highly conventionalized, 
cannot be identified independently of the 
perceptions of the participants. In this sense, 
they have the property of contexts generally in 
being the resultant of definition by the 
participants. The definition of formats communally 
is one of the major ways in which a community 
controls the interaction of its members. Once a 
format is conventionalized and "socialized" it comes 
to be seen as having externality and constraint and 
(in Karl Popper's 1968 sense) becomes "objective."
This is typical of such speech act formats as 
"promising."...
It is the goal-directed aspect of formats that makes 
the signalling of intention (and the signalling of 
uptake) so simple. This is greatly aided by the fact 
that early formats are so overt, as in games like 
hide-and seek, give-and take, peek-a-boo, and where’s 
the X?...Infants learn early to signal intended action 
formats and to expect uptake. Indeed, what seems to be
18
going on is a segmentation of the action into 
constituents, the child then seeking an appropriate 
way of signalling his intentions to the adult not 
only at the beginning, but at each segment. This 
provides the almost ideal-typical case of framing, 
for it assures that the child knows the referent 
for which he is signalling and can recognize by 
immediate context what the mother’s utterance, 
provided as corrective " m e a n s . ( p . 36-37).
Bruner (1975) also comments upon intention in the very 
young child:
The one thing that is special about the kinds of 
concepts the child is said to be operating with is that 
they are based on the presumption that the child 
grasps the "idea" of intei— subjectivity— that others 
have intentions...
This is not to say that the child is born equipped 
with a "finished conceptual schema" for interpreting 
inter-subjective phenomena— that he "knows about” 
sharing experience with another from the start, 
or knows about another’s intentions. Rather, it is 
to say that the child has the innate capacity to 
construct such schemata. He does so by interpreting 
feedback from another as constituting a special class 
of events in contrast to other events. And he is 
greatly aided in this by the existence of
19
systematic intentional (or intention-like! > behavior 
in the people with whom he comes in contact.® (p.8) 
Similar ideas and concerns have been identified in the 
language learning of young apes. Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) 
reviews the language learning studies with apes that have 
shown that intention could not be attributed to primates in 
language use. The language learning of this lower species, 
though demonstrating ability, was faulted on the grounds 
that the ability was shown merely as a performance for a 
reward without true symbolic meaning. Since that time, 
Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) has published evidence of what could 
be identified as intentional communication in the ape. 
Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) reports:
Initially it was assumed that apes, unlike children, 
could not acquire symbols observationally, but had to 
be rewarded for using the correct symbol (Gardner & 
Gardner, 1971; Premack, 1971), and often the object of 
note had to be shown to them before they could 
name it (Terrace, 1979).® (p. 210)
These conclusions which were based on either a vocal or a 
sign language system have been shown to be erroneous. 
Savage-Rumbaugh explains:
In retrospect, the imitative skills required by 
either of these systems were beyond the capacity of 
young apes (Tomasello, 1990). Because the apes could 
not easily imitate either the words or the signs.
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shaping and reward of the response morphology was 
required. Such shaping functioned to deter 
comprehension and referential learning, because it 
stressed response topology, being "right" at the 
expense of communicating, and coming to understand the 
communication of others. (p. 210)
Savage-Rumbaugh has recorded the acquisition of lexical 
and vocal symbols through observational learning of Kansi, a 
pygmy chimpanzee (Pan paniscus) (Savage-Rumbaugh, Sevcik, 
Rumbaugh, & Rubert, 1985), and three other apes (two pygmy 
chimpanzees and one common chimpanzee) (Brakke & Savage- 
Rumbaugh, 1989). Contextual data of the symbol acquisition 
of two additional chimpanzees reared with Kansi trace the 
evolution of words used first in routine-dependent 
imitation, to iniatiation of routines, to the use of the 
words to control which routine is selected by the 
caretakers, to "generalized comments" that finally reflect 
sophisticated comprehension and word usage.
Whereas Bruner (1983) uses the term "format" in 
identifying contextual interaction, Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) 
uses "routine." In the rearing of chimpanzees by human 
caretakers, Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) shows that the 
acquisition of symbols begins with the learning of a 
routine. Furthermore, the routine would be a "...more or 
less regularly sequenced set of interindividual interactions 
that occur in a relatively similar manner across time, or at
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different times” (p.215). Some examples of routines would be 
changing diapers, getting ready to go outdoors, taking a 
bath, riding in the car, packing a backpack, blowing 
bubbles, etc. The chimpanzee may be a willing or unwilling 
participant or observer.
Once the routine is comprehended by the ape, behavior 
will reflect this comprehension; for instance, a young 
chimpanzee may wait patiently for the nipple to be placed on 
the bottle in the ’’preparing the milk bottle” routine rather 
than grabbing a bottle without the nipple and perhaps 
pouring and spilling the milk. This learning of routines is 
accomplished by very young apes with no explicit 
reinforcement. The routine is inevitably accompanied by 
gestural, lexical, or vocal markers by the caretakers to 
convey the intended action to the ape. Savage-Rumbaugh 
(1991) states:
Once the routine is understood, it will be initiated 
by the ape. At first, such initiations will be rather 
primitive in the sense that they will be action based 
and context dependent. For example, the chimpanzee may 
see the bottle of bubbles among other toys and pick it 
up and look at the caretaker. By selecting the bubbles 
from among other things, the chimpanzee thus has 
conveyed its desire to execute the ’’bubble-blowing” 
routine. Later, it may simply point to the bubbles and 
look at the caretaker. Still later, it will point
to the BUBBLES lexigram and turn to the caretaker.
In so doing, the ape moves from being a passive 
observer of a routine to an active participant, to a 
primitive initiator, to a communicator symbolically 
announcing his or her intentions to another party 
(p.217) (see Footnote 9)
Examples are provided by Savage-Rumbaugh (1991).
If Kanzi wants to blow bubbles, he may pick out 
the bubble bottle, open it, and begin to blow bubbles. 
However, commencing and carrying out such a routine 
without markers or signals being directed to others 
is successful only to the extent that others need 
not be involved or coordinate their behavior with 
Kanzi in any predictable manner. If others are 
involved, they can cooperate only if they know the 
routine. For example, should Kanzi wish to play 
with bubbles while out in the woods, it will be 
necessary to retrieve them from the caretaker’s 
backpack. If Kanzi simply walks over to the 
caretaker and grabs his or her backpack and starts 
pulling things out of it, this will be responded to 
in a negative manner. It is not that the caretaker 
does not want Kanzi to play with the bubbles, but 
unless he announces his intended action, the 
caretaker will not understand why the backpack has 
been taken and is being rifled through. If, however,
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Kanzi announces ’’bubbles,” and points to the 
caretaker’s backpack, he can be given the backpack 
with knowledge of his intended action. Everyone, 
including Kanzi, is comfortable because they know what 
is being done, and within reason, what will occur 
next: Kanzi will play with the bubbles and perhaps
solicit the interactions of others in the bubble- 
blowing game. However, if the back pack is simply 
grabbed, no one in the group is sure what will 
happen next. The caretaker may get angry and try to 
grab it back, Kanzi may climb a tree with the 
backpack if he sees the caretaker is angry, 
everything may fall out of the backpack, and so forth, 
and no comfortable, coordinated, agreed-upon 
routine will be in place. (p.222)
As shown in the above example, Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) 
believes that symbolic markers are acquired for the purpose 
of controlling events:
The driving force that moves the ape from symbol 
comprehension to symbol production is the desire to 
exert some control over what happens or is done next. 
To the degree that future events entail social 
companions, it becomes propitious to achieve joint 
engagement by announcing intent. To the extent that 
the ape fails to do so, it has little control over 
what happens to it next. In a sense, this perspective
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is similar to that offered by Bruner (1983) when he 
observed that for children "the engine that drives the 
enterprise is not language acquisition per se, but the 
need to get on with the demands of culture" (p.103). 
Culture, however, is a very general term, making it 
difficult to know just what it is that is driving the 
child— other than the desire to be like other human 
beings. In our view, it is not culture that is 
driving the ape, but the desire for control. (p.223) 
Chomsky would, no doubt, object to comparisons of the 
language of human children with that of apes, for he 
believes the human language to be species-specific. In an 
interview (Reiber, 1983), Chomsky states:
Let me begin by saying something that I hope 
is uncontroversial. Namely, there is something 
characteristic of the human species— there is some 
species-specific property, some part of human 
biological endowment that contributes 
to the growth of language in the mind. That is, 
language doesn’t grow in a rock or in a bird 
under comparable conditions of stimulation.
That’s obvious, I hope. So, therefore, there 
is something about the human mind that plays a 
role in determining that knowledge of language 
grows, develops in that mind. A second point 
that is equally obvious is that the way in which
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language grows in the mind is going to be affected 
by the nature of the outside environment; that is, 
if we’re growing up in the United States, we’ll 
learn to speak English and if we’re growing up 
in parts of East Africa, we’11 learn to speak 
Swahili. That’s again obvious. So what’s clear 
is that there is some biological capacity which 
differentiates us from rocks and birds and apes and 
so on; it plainly isn’t Just a sensory capacity, 
because we can easily translate language into 
some other sensory modality accessible to birds 
or apes and the same observation will hold. So 
there is some mental characteristic, if you like—  
something about our nature which reflects itself 
in the structure and growth of a particular mental 
organ that constitutes the intrinsic, innate 
contribution to the growth of language.’'-’ (p 49)
It does appear, though, that Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) has 
provided the ’’comparable conditions of stimulation” of human 
children for young apes and has shown comparable results. 
It may be that the ’’growth” of language is species-specific 
in the human child, but the innateness of the seed of that 
language certainly seems to be phylogentically inherited as 
exhibited through communication ability in both species.
Ve have seen this tendency in the work of Savage-Rumbaugh 
(1991) with young apes, although they do not explicitly
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employ translations, and the development in the human child 
will be shown by Carroll (1986).
Background for Definitions
The Sentence
The transformational approach to grammar (Chomsky, 
1957) stipulates that a child seeks to impose a specific 
kind of structure in the formation of sentences. This 
process of relating a sentence to a set of sentence-like 
structures is carried on anew every time the language is 
learned by a child. These sentence-like structures are 
actually very simple sentences with a noun phrase and a verb 
phrase. Through a system of transformational rules, more 
complicated sentences are generated. The process is highly 
intricate. Labov (1970) has identified five major steps of 
substitution, deletion, and conversion that must be made to 
derive the sentence, "John wants to know how you like him.” 
from "John wants;" "John knows;" and "You like John how." 
These underlying propositions are related and transformed to 
produce the final surface structure or spoken sentence.
Holophrastic Sentences
The first sentence-like structures spoken by children 
are one-word "sentences" These are called holophrastic 
sentences by Fromkin and Rodman (1983) and appear 
sometime around the age of twelve months. They include such 
words as "Hi;" "Ho;” "Don’t;" "Up," ("Get me up.” ).
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The holophrastic stage is preceded by the babbling 
stage for about six months in which the pitch or intonation 
contours begin to resemble the intonation contours of 
sentences of adults.
Telegraphic Stage
The stage of telegraphic speech follows the 
holophrastic stage. In this stage, the sentence 
is more complete, but small "function" words ( e.g., "so,"
"the," "can") are left out so that the message is more like
that of a telegram from Western Union. This stage occurs 
around 24 months of age (Fromkin & Rodman, 1983>. Of 
course, all ages and stages may be different for individual 
children.
Telegraphic Sentences
"Cat stand up table."
"What that?"
"He play little tune."
"Andrew want that."
"Cathy build house."
"Ho, sit there."’ ' (Fromkin & Rodman, 1983, p.330)
Gradually, more words are added so that the sentences, 
around the age of five years are many times 
indistinguishable from those of adults (Clark & Clark,
1977). It is generally assumed by linguists that a child’s 
competence, or understanding of sentences precedes 
his/her production of sentences in speech (Ingram, 1989).
2 8
The sentence form used in the theory of sentence-signs 
presented here will be that of the short, simple sentence 
such as "The lady sings;" or "I’m watching you." The
translations of Sign-sentence theory are based on initial 
meaning embodied in the syntax of the language. Innatist 
linguists have proposed these to be the basic sentences from 
which all other sentences are made. Hirsh-Pasek and 
Golinkoff (1991) have shown that infants display competence 
in understanding of these sentences during their first year 
of life. (Their infant subjects faced with two monitors 
with different television pictures choose the proper display 
to match a verbal sentence; e.g., "She’s kissing the 
keys."). Children use these sentences in verbal 
communication when they are about three years old. This 
basic sentence is similar to what Chomsky (1957, 1965) calls
"deep structures." Crain (1992) explains the concept of
deep structures:
When we create, comprehend, and transform
sentences, we intuitively work on two levels. We attend
both to the surface structure and to the deep structure 
of sentences...Consider these sentences:
Susan ate the apple.
The apple was eaten by Susan.
Susan did not eat the apple.
What did Susan eat?
Susan ate the apple, didn’t she? (p.305)
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(see Footnote 1)
Crain identifies the first sentence ("Susan ate the apple.” ) 
as the one closest to one of deep structure.
... It is a simple, active, declarative sentence and 
follows the subject-verb—object word order. It is the 
basic kernel sentence upon which one can perform 
certain operations to generate all the other sentences. 
One could not take any other sentence... and derive a 
clear set of operations for creating the others 
(Chomsky, 1957, pp. 45, 91; 1965, pp 138-41)...
McNeill (1971) has hypothesized that children will 
initially speak in deep structures. (p.305-306)
(see Footnote 1)
The kernel or deep structure type sentence form is 
sufficiently close to that of the child's beginning sentence 
form and complete enough in its structure for use by adults. 
Therefore, these definitions follow:
Definition of Terms
Sentence: Any simple declarative construction 
following the subject-verb 
or subj ect-verb-obj ect word order 
depicting a conceptual representation of 
deep structural knowledge that is performed 
through speech and writing in communication.
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Examples of sentences:
The man walks (is walking).
She holds (is holding) the book.
The cat is on the table.
The lady is watching you.
Sentence—sign: Any produced behavior which makes a
statement as a conceptual representation of deep structural 
knowledge and is, therefore, recognizable to communicators 
participating in real life formats through visual or other
sensory means and may be translated'= into a
simple sentence.
Such behavior, recognizable to all participants in any 
given format, is used by the participants to hold one 
another accountable as participants in the task at hand. We 
see this in McDermott et al. (1981) in their
discussion of the children’s reading group (which will be
used later to demonstrate sign-sentence theory):
Members usually hold each other accountable for 
proceeding in ways consistent with the context 
for their concerted activities. Perhaps the most 
compelling of the criteria for locating people’s 
answer to the question of ’’What’s happening?” at 
any given moment is that the members of any group 
hold each other to behaving in certain contextually 
appropriate ways. Depending upon the positioning 
that the group members achieve, there are only certain
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kinds of behavior which are acceptable at certain 
moments, and the members call upon those who 
misbehave to change their behavior to fit the 
dominant version of what that positioning should 
look like. This is most clearly the case in the 
classroom reading activities by the teacher calling 
them back, by other members of the group simply 
stopping their own participation until the stragglers 
return, or, in a case to be described in detail, by an 
elaborate postural-kinesic dance in which the children 
and the teacher quietly round each other up until they 
all return to the book to read. (p.381)
(see Footnote 3)
The behaviors which correspond to the above examples of 
sentences would be:
The man walking;
The woman holding the book;
The cat sitting on the table;
The lady looking at you.
These signs would include all movements such as smiling, 
talking, walking, reaching, standing, etc.
Sign-sentence: the spoken or written translation of a
sentence-sign. This is not to imply that this is a verbal 
sentence, but a representation of conceptual knowledge 
common to prelinguistic as well as linguistic communicators, 
and expressed in a sentence to convey the nonverbal
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statement (depicted by the sign, the behavioral display) as 
linguistic communicators would do.
The linguistic meaning, therefore, is found in the simple 
sentence with the subject/verb/object pattern to convey the 
nonverbal statement of the behavioral displays.
From these aspects of sentences and sentence—signs used in 
language and communication may be derived a definition of 
communication.
Communication; the exchange of messages by two or more 
interactants who participate in concert and hold one another 
accountable for the accomplishment of goals in a format 
through the use of sentences including sign-sentences and 
sentence-signs.
The sentence as a code for translations
Because the communication context of formats includes 
all the behavior in the context as communication in Sign- 
sentence theory, certain theorists would find the theory and 
its use of the sentence code objectionable. Wiener, Devoe, 
Rubinow, and Geller (1972) like Burgoon, Buller, and Woodall 
(1989) object to defining all behavior in interaction as 
communication. They, therefore, oppose Watzlawick, Beavin, 
and Jackson (1967). Wiener et al. (1972) identify these 
authors as those:
who explicitly define communication as "any 
behavior occurring in the presence of another.”
Investigators who hold this view seem to justify 
the use of the context (interpersonal setting) as 
defining communication behaviors, by trying to show 
how the behaviors which do occur in this setting 
can be understood by an observer. In showing how 
they make sense of the behaviors, they, like many 
others, seem to be making the transformation and 
fusing the notions of sign and communication which 
from our viewpoint require separation. (p.198)
If communication is defined in such a way that 
"all" behaviors are to be included in the category, 
there is nothing to be gained from labeling this 
all-inclusive category as "communication" rather 
than simply as "behaviors” in an interpersonal 
context. Incidentally, it is not always clear 
whether investigators who hold this definition 
mean that all behaviors of which they can make 
sense, which reoccur, and which elicit predictable 
responses from the other people in the context 
will be i n c l u d e d . ( p . 199)
Where the participants in an interaction include a 
child and an adult, the child is always in a state of 
learning and the adult is always in a state of modeling. 
Bandura (1962) has identified the modeling process in his 
Social Learning theory Communication in such interaction
with a child, in contrast to adult—to-adult, can be said to 
be on a highly exaggerated level, especially if the child is 
less than five years old. Children of this age have an 
uncanny imitative ability and Mbntessori preschool teachers 
present many lessons nonverbally. Sign-sentence theory can 
provide the communication dimension to show how the modeling 
process actually works. For example, a Montessori teacher’s 
nonverbal presention of the Handwashing Exercise to a 
preschool student in the classroom might show the 
communication messages through translations such as these:
First, I put on my apron.
Then, I stand at the table.
I pick up the pitcher with both hands.
I hold the handle with one hand.
I place my other hand on the other side of the 
pitcher.
I tip or move the pitcher over.
I pour some water into the basin.
I set the pitcher down on the table.
Etc.
For adults, some might call these movements "mindless,” but 
in an interaction with a preschool child, this is total 
communication which is exclusively nonverbal. The teacher 
must present the movements accurately, for if any false or 
irrelevant movements are introduced, the child will produce
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these also in his/her presentation when s/he takes his/her 
turn. Certainly, all the behavior must be included as 
communication.
Coding nonverbal behavior in this way with simple 
sentences is different from traditional nonverbal coding. 
Ekman and Friesen (1969) conceptualize coding for verbal and 
nonverbal behavior as extrinsic or intrinsic. They explain: 
An extrinsic code is one in which the act signifies 
or stands for something else, and the coding may be 
arbitrary or iconic. An intrinsic code is in a sense 
no code in that the act does not stand for but is its 
significant: the meaning of the act is intrinsic to
the action itself. Ve will characterize these as 
three coding principles: ARBITRARY (extrinsic) codes,
ICONIC (extrinsic) codes, and INTRINSIC codes.
Acts which are arbitrarily coded bear no visual 
resemblance to what they signify. In this they are 
like words, most of which do not sound like what they 
mean; exceptions are words like "shush" and "buzz.”
When the opening and closing of the raised hand 
signifies greeting or departure, we have an example of 
arbitrary coding of nonverbal behavior, since the 
movement does not intrinsically show what it signifies.
Acts which are iconically coded carry the clue to 
their decoding in their appearances ; the nonverbal act, 
the sign, looks in some way like what it means, its
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significant.
Acts which are intrinsically coded are, like 
iconically coded behavior, visually related to what 
they signify. But unlike the iconically coded act, 
the intrinsically coded act does not resemble its 
significant; it is its significant, at least in part. 
If one person hits another during conversation, that 
is not similar to aggression; it is one form of 
aggression; the act is the significant.
Knapp and Hall <1992) point out that it is the 
arbitrary coding system that Wiener et al. (1972) would 
study as a part of a nonverbal code. Knapp and Hall recap 
the logic behind this conceptualization:
The logic behind this ...goes like this:
(1) Start with a known code, for example, verbal 
language. (2) Nonverbal behaviors associated with 
certain verbal behaviors are then identified.
(3) When the verbal channel is eliminated, these 
nonverbal behaviors will predictably be introduced for 
communicating. (4) If the introduction of the 
nonverbal behaviors does not significantly change the 
receiver's understanding of the message, then those 
nonverbal behaviors are considered a substitute for 
verbal behavior and therefore components of a 
nonverbal code— that is, an agreed upon set of rules 
for determining meanings assigned to certain
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signals.(p.10) (see Footnote 2)
Knapp and Hall continue,
In fact, there are probably relatively few 
nonverbal behaviors that would qualify as 
"communication" by this standard. Host often, 
nonverbal phenomena are used at the receiving 
end for drawing inferences, as when we infer 
depression from a person’s slumping posture.
Surely the depressed person is not trying to 
communicate depression. (p.10) (see Footnote 2)
Knapp and Hall are correct if inferences are to be 
made, which would probably be the case in the theory of 
Wiener et al. (1972). However, for Sign-sentence theory, 
the matter in question here is not the inference that the 
person is depressed but merely the translation of slumping 
behavior into the sentence, "He is slumping." or "He 
slumps. "
The translation could not be "He is depressed," a 
translation which might develop from additional messages or 
further transformations. If the meaning is inherent to the 
behavior, the behavior may be removed, and the sentence 
stands in its stead; or if the sentence is removed, the 
behavior continues to hold the meaning.
Wiener et al. (1972) would no doubt object to such 
intrinsic meaning, since they object to intrinsic coding.
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To the extent that Ekman and Friesen seem to 
imply that coded behavior is used to signify some 
referent, it is difficult to see why they have 
included, in coding, behaviors which have no 
referents other than themselves. Again, in our 
framework, a code is taken to be a set of behaviors 
which have referents other than themselves; with this 
concept, it makes no sense to include, as coding, 
behaviors which do not have such referents. To 
imply that every behavior is coded in some way, as 
Ekman and Friesen seem to do, dilutes the importance 
of both the concept of code and the concept of coding, 
and leads once again to the possibility of including 
any and all behaviors as part of a communication 
system, (p.201-202) (see Footnote 13)
The "concept of coding" referred to by Weiner et 
al.(1972) above, as well as that of Burgoon, Buller, and 
Woodall (1989) and Burgoon (1985), along with the coding 
system of Ekman and Friesen (1969) explained above, all 
share the same type of coding system which is a naming 
system drawing names or labels of common meaning from the 
culture to match to or name nonverbal behavior and, thereby, 
attach meaning to the behavior. This is not the coding 
system of sign-sentence theory which finds meaning in the 
structure of the sentence which produces the surface meaning 
from the unspoken deep structual knowledge of the infant.
39
These deep structures previously explained by Crain (1992) 
as "kernel sentences" and theorized as intuitive knowledge 
in the description of English syntax (Chomsky, 1957), have 
been identified as competence in the understanding of 
English sentences in infants in the experiment of Hirsh- 
Paseck and Golinkoff (1991) as we shall see later. These 
sentences and the formulaic transformations identified by 
Chomsky (1957) may be used by speakers of English to produce 
an endless number of original more complicated sentences. 
Similarly, Bruner (1975) has theorized that infants have 
innate knowledge of intei— subjectivity which provides 
potential competence for interaction in communication 
formats. He has identified some of these beginning formats 
as infant games (e.g., peek-a-boo) (Bruner, 1983). Savage- 
Rumbaugh (1991) has demonstrated that young apes also have 
this ability for aquiring language observationally by 
participation in beginning routines (e.g., blowing bubbles 
game). Competence in language and competence in format 
participation provide the meaning for behavior which is an 
understanding of the structure of language and the structure 
of formats. The words or vocabulary culturally provided 
merely fill in that structure. Knapp and Hall (1992),
Wiener et al. (1972), Burgoon et al. (1989), Burgoon (1985), 
and Ekman and Friesen (1969) are exclusively concerned with 
cultural vocabulary, not structure. Vocabulary may change 
over time, but structure remains the same.
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The idea that the structure of language as used in 
human formats is vital to meaning is not new.
Wittgenstein’s theory, as explained by Hartnack (1986), 
provides a simple illustration:
Now it is possible to imagine a primitive language 
situation or language-form— what Wittgenstein calls a 
language game— where there would be some reason for 
maintaining that the meaning of a word is the thing to 
which it refers. It is conceivable that the 
conversation between a skilled workman and his mate 
might consist of names only, that is, the names of the 
tools needed by the workman and handed to him by his 
mate every time he mentions one of them. Such a 
language— or a language game— consists of names only, 
and in order to master the language one must learn 
what the individual names refer to...(But) Has the 
mate learned this language game as soon as he knows 
the names of the tool? Certainly not. He knows, 
for instance, that this particular thing is called 
a hammer. But what does he suppose the workman means 
when he says, "Hammer." Does it mean that he is 
repeating the name to himself? Or is he uncertain, 
and asking the mate to reassure him that this is 
really a hammer? Or does it mean that he wants the 
mate to give him the hammer? Or does it have some 
further and completely different meaning? The mate who
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knows only what the word "hammer" stands for has no 
way of understanding what the workman means when he 
says, "Hammer." He has not learned the language-game 
simply by knowing what the words name. In this 
particular game, "hammer" means more than a particular 
tool; it means that this particular tool must be 
handed to the workman.’® (pp.64-66).
Kendon (1972) explaining the theory of 
Birdwhistell (1970) echos Wittgenstein’s (Hartnack, 1986) 
philosophy:
For him, to ask what a given unit of body motion 
"means" is to ask what its "use" is. Questions such 
as, What does it mean when a person smiles? or What 
does it mean when a person raises his fist and shakes 
it back and forth? can only be answered by giving a 
list of the environments in which these forms are 
generally seen. In other words, we can answer these 
questions in terms of the range of use. (p.446)
(see Footnote 4)
It is this use based on the organzing structure of the 
intuitive knowledge of the infant for language and formats 
which provides meaning to communicative behavior in Sign- 
sentence theory.
Wiener et al. (1972) would also object to any 
implication of universal meaning.
Since we assume that the relationship between
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the code component and its referent is most often 
arbitrary, that is any behavior A, B, or C can be used 
to refer to any experience X, Y, or Z, as long 
as the participants agree that a given behavior 
(e.g., A) stands for or refers to a particular 
experience (e.g., X), we would not expect any 
nonverbal communicative behaviors to have universal 
significance, as some investigators apparently 
imply (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971). Rather, we 
would expect cross-cultural differences and even 
sub-group differences in (a) the experience to be 
made public, (b) the nonverbal behaviors used to 
make experience public, and (c) the relationship 
between experience and the particular nonverbal 
behaviors, (see Footnote 13)
If organizing structures are biologically endowed, they 
would have to be universal, although different cultures 
would provide different languages for their content and 
vocabulary. Crain (1992) comments upon this:
Many psycholinguists believe there may be 
universels in the developmental process. So far 
the evidence is strongest for the earliest phases. 
Children everywhere probably proceed from babbling 
to one-word to two-word utterances. Babbling and 
two-word structures, in particular, appear to be 
highly similar throughout the world. (Brown &
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Herrnstein, 1975, pp. 477-79; Sachs, 1976)
The search for syntactic nniversals after the 
two-word phase becomes very difficult, and the search 
has really just begun. Some evidence suggests that 
children everywhere may initially handle negatives in 
the same manner, and they may overregularize some 
parts of speech (Slobin, 1972, 1973; Cairns and 
Cairns, 1976, p.205). By the time children are 
mastering transformations, they are clearly using 
rules that differ somewhat from language to 
language. Still there may be universal 
considerations, such as structure dependence, 
which limit the rules they will learn. (p.309)
(see Footnote 1)
Optional rules may differ for different languages, but this 
would not cancel the universality of beginning language 
structure and development.
That self-conscious enactment may be only a temporary 
awareness is proposed by Wiener et al. (1972). On this, we 
can agree: This becomes an important issue in Sign-sentence
theory when applying the same sign sentences to nonverbal 
communication throughout the life span.
Ve assume further that the relationship between 
A and experience X, for a particular communication 
group, must at the start of the relationship between 
A and X (or in developing any formal code) have
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been made with some awareness, although the 
experience of self-conscious use of A to stand 
for X may dissipate for the group as well as for 
the individual with increasing association between 
A and X. That is, we view this shift to nonawareness 
as being no different than the equivalent change 
in awareness in driving a car. (pp.203-204).
^see Footnote 13)
Weiner et al, (1972) set the criteria for selecting behaviors 
to study as possible components in a communication code: 
There are several criteria that such behaviors must 
meet if we are to consider them as possible components 
in a communication code, as opposed to reactions to 
some immediate stimulus or as opposed to a socially 
patterned behavior (i.e,.patterned behavior learned 
in the process of acculturation) :
» A. The behaviors must be -emitted by the particular 
communication group studied. This criterion 
eliminates idiosyncratic behaviors and meets 
the requirement of socially shared behaviors.
B. The behaviors must occur in several different
contexts. This criterion is likely to 
eliminate some behaviors which are reactions 
to a specific set of stimulus conditions.
C. The behaviors must be more likely to occur
8 in verbal contexts than in any or all
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other contexts. If a behavior (e.g.,scratching) 
can occur in any context— that is, with or 
without an addressee— it is difficult to accept 
it as a possible component in a communication 
code.
D. The behaviors as code components should
encompass a relatively short time duration.
This criterion serves to focus on ongoing 
experience rather than on socially prescribed 
patterns of behavior or on behavior related to 
personality styles (e.g., the wearing of rings 
or the handling of teacups). (p.209)
(see Footnote 13)
Sign-sentence theory would propose different criteria: 
Whatever occurs in the communication exchange between two 
interactants in a particular routine, format, or context to 
accomplish the goals of that routine would have to be 
included for analysis. Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) has 
identified the routines or formats in which young apes are 
engaged (e.g., diaper changing, bottle preparation, etc.). 
Bruner has identified similar routines for young children 
(1983). Each format with two or more interactants must 
stand as a system with its own systematic goals. As we have 
seen in Kendon’s (1972) discussion of systems, no behavior 
which is part of the system can be excluded.
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All message exchanges in Sign-sentence theory should be 
considered as valid messages, even if a message may be 
encoded as affect disply (e.g., crying). The behavior may 
be a response to certain environmental stimuli, but the 
message is still there (i.e., "I'm crying.").
The behaviors considered as communication events from 
the Sign-sentence approach will always be bound to and a 
part of the contex. Since all behavior in any communication 
format is part of the context, it is also true that time 
duration has no importance An exchange may occur briefly as 
in a "passing someone in the hall" routine or may encompass 
a longer time such as an houi— long "classroom lecture" 
format. For all of these reasons, it is evident that the 
theory of Wiener and his associates is not compatible with 
that of Sign-sentence theory. The same can be said for that 
of Burgoon.
Burgoon (1985) reviews the research and significant 
findings in the area of nonverbal communication. She 
summarizes these findings:
Nonverbal signals are essential ingredients in the 
interpersonal communication mix. Research 
substantiates that they carry a significant, and 
often dominant, portion of the social meaning in 
face-to-face interchanges. Whether their importance 
is attributable to innate orientations toward
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nonverbal signals, to the superiority of nonverbal 
codes in performing certain interpersonal functions, 
to the manner in which nonverbal cues are cognitively 
processed, or to their special coding properties, it 
is clear that nonverbal signals are more than mere 
auxiliaries to the verbal stream. They manifest many 
of the same properites as verbal language (such as 
rule structures, discrete units, multiple meanings, 
and transformation), as well as exhibit some unique 
ones (such as universality, multimodal simultaneous 
encoding, and iconicity). This mandates a broader, 
more integrated view of exactly what constitutes 
language or interpersonal discourse.’'^ (p. 381) 
Burgoon specifies the language properties of nonverbal 
signals first as discrete units using Dittmann's (1978) 
examples of emblems, smiles, head nods, eye contact, 
gestures, postural shifts, degree of body lean, and body 
orientation. Second, rules are identified for semantic, 
syntactic, and pragmatic use:
Single cues and combinations of cues show 
semanticity in that they have consistently recognized 
meanings. A head nod, for instance, conveys such 
affirmative meanings as agreement, approval, and 
attentiveness...Similarly, nonverbal expressions 
exhibit syntacity in that they follow combinatory and
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never displayed together because they would create a 
nonsensical display...At the pragmatic, or use 
level, nonverbal presentations are governed by 
cultural and subcultural norms and display rules.
(p.351) (see Footnote 16)
Although Burgoon identifies nonverbal expressions as 
exhibiting syntacity, she attributes this to combinatory and 
ordering rules, not to the deep structural knowledge of 
syntax of the infant as does Sign-sentence theory.
The third language property which Burgoon identifies is 
that nonverbal behaviors are context-bound.
Just as interpretations of words and sentences 
rely on the rest of an utterance or the interactional 
context to make clear their meanings, so do 
nonverbal interpretations rely on the linguistic 
context, the other co-occurring nonverbal cues, 
and/or the interactional context for clarification.
(p.351) (see Footnote 16)
Burgoon describes nonverbal communication as "context 
bound," but according to this approach, certain units of 
behavior would be extracted out of the communication 
context. The reason for this is that Burgoon’s approach, in 
its effort to find meaning for nonverbal signals, draws 
semantics exclusively from the cultural vocabulary, 
excluding the innate knowledge of structural use in the 
Sign-sentence approach. Burgoon acknowledges:
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excluding the innate knowledge of structural use in the 
Sign-sentence approach. Burgoon acknowledges:
Just as a coding system must have semantic and 
syntactic rules, so must nonverbal signals as they 
are combined to form messages— if they are to be 
treated as a coding system. This assumption delimits 
the nonverbal domain to the extent that it 
excludes behaviors lacking consistent meanings 
and behaviors that fail to be combined in 
systematic, "grammatical" ways with other nonverbal 
signals. (Burgoon, 1985, p.349) (see Footnote 16) 
Burgoon also discusses the property of transformation; 
however, she does not identify appropriate deep structure: 
Fourth, nonverbal codes have the property of 
transformation; that is, a relatively small set 
of basic meanings may give rise to a variety of 
different forms of expression, all of which 
are semantically equivalent. Like "surface 
structures” in language, these different forms 
are all transformations of the same underlying 
meaning. A caress, close physical proximity, 
or a flirtatious smile may all communicate 
intimacy. (p.351) (see Footnote 16)
I would agree with Burgoon that nonverbal behavior has 
the property of transformation. However, for the examples 
above, intimacy is not the deep structure of basic meaning
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which she implies, but the transformed one, or the surface 
structure, or the adult meaning. The basic meaning of a 
caress would be, "He is caressing her.” or "He is hugging 
her." etc. This is transformed into "He is being intimate 
with her." The same would be true of the other examples: 
"He is standing close to her." "She smiles." or "She is 
smiling at him." and "She is flirting."
Because of the seemingly overwhelming task of finding 
names or consensually-agreed on labels for all behavior, 
Burgoon finds it necessary to distinguish some behavior as 
communication and other behavior merely as behavior.
Burgoon defines the broad category of "behavior" as "any 
actions or reactions performed by an organism" (Burgoon, et 
al. 1989, p.14) Behavior can take place without others 
witnessing it, responding to it, or understanding it.
It seems more useful to distinguish between the 
broad category of "behavior," which encompasses 
"any actions or reactions performed by an organism," 
and the more specific category of communication.
The difference is that behavior can take place without 
others witnessing it, responding to it, or 
understanding it. Typically, routine activities such 
as sleeping and eating would be classified as 
"informative behaviors" rather than as communication 
unless there is some apparent attempt to make a 
statement through the manner in which they are done
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or the context in which they occur. As with verbal 
communication, there should be some notion of a sender 
encoding and transmitting a message to a receiver 
before an action is labeled communication. It is 
doubtful that a person taking a nap in the privacy 
of her own home intends to communicate something 
to an accidental observer; however, if she chooses 
to do it in the middle of a political science 
lecture, the publicness and inappropriateness of the 
act may suggest that it is a statement. The important 
point is that not every behavior should be regarded 
as communication; as with information, "communication 
is a subset of behavior, which is itself a subset of 
information." This perspective reduces to a 
manageable level the number of things that qualify as 
nonverbal communication.’^ (Burgoon et al. 1989, p. 14) 
Burgoon proposes that a definition of communication 
should have a "message orientation.”
An alternative that I have proposed elsewhere 
(Burgon, 1980) is a message orientation. What 
qualifies as communication are those behaviors that 
form a socially shared coding system; that is, 
they are behaviors that are typically sent with 
intent, used with regularity among members of a 
social community, are typically interpreted as 
intentional, and have consensually recognizable
interpretations. This approach is similar to 
that of Wiener, Devoe, Rubinow and Geller (1972) 
in emphasizing socially shared rather than 
idiosyncratic behavior patterns. However, it is 
broader than their approach in that it includes 
habitual behaviors that have well-recognized 
meanings among members of the social system.
The key word is "typically.” If a behavior is 
usually encoded deliberately and is usually 
interpreted as meaningful by receivers or 
observers, it does not matter if, on a given 
occasion, it is performed unconsciously or 
unintentionally: it still qualifies as a
message. Thus the "unintended” frown qualifies 
because the behavior is one that people typically 
encode as a signal of displeasure and typically 
decode as an intentional signal of displeasure.
If one accepts the notion that much of our daily 
nonverbal communication is we 11-practiced and 
operates in a semi-automatic fashion (what some 
call "mindless” fashion), then it becomes more 
productive to attempt to identify the "vocabulary” 
of nonverbal communication than to divine intent 
on each occasion of a behavior’s enactment. At 
the same time, this approach requires that a 
behavior be regularly used as part of a coding
system, which implies that communicators 
frequently treat it as a purposive and 
meaningful signal. (Burgoon, 1985, pp. 346-349)
(see Footnote 16)
According to this view, if the busboy at the local 
pizza place wears unmatched tennis shoes, this may be 
merely idiosyncratic behavior and is unlikely to 
produce consistent meaning among observers. It may be 
informative— we may infer from it that he is 
disorganized or socially inept— but we would probably 
not regard this single behavior as communication. 
However, if it is coupled with other behaviors such as 
wearing spiked blue hair and one earring, it becomes 
apparent that the busboy is attempting to make a 
statement. The totality of his appearance is likely 
to produce consistent recognition of him as a would-be 
punker. Thus a key criterion for deciding if something 
is communication is whether or not a behavior or 
collection of behaviors generates consensually 
agreed-on meaning within a culture or subculture.
(Burgoon et al. 1989, p.17) (see Footnote 17)
I very much admire Burgoon for her insight into the 
language-like qualities of nonverbal communication; however, 
since her theory is based on the premise that meaning of 
behavior stems from a labeling process that is considered 
"consensually agreed-on.” Sign-sentence theory cannot accept
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it as a totally valid theory. Burgoon would exclude 
behaviors in Sign-sentence theory because they are not 
typically understood. But, as we have seen in the work of 
Kendon <1972) and Wittgenstein (Hartnack, 1986), merely 
naming things does not produce full meaning. It is in the 
understanding of structural usage that true meaning may be 
found. This is the premise of Sign-sentence theory, that 
the meaning of communication originates in that 
understanding of structure present in the beginning of life 
of every human being and develops therefrom.
Another admirable facet of Burgoon's theory is her 
identification of the social functions of nonverbal 
communication. Describing nonverbal behavior as a 
collective of regular and meaningful patterns, she names the 
performance of these patterns:
Social functions for which such patterns have been 
identified include facilitation of cognitive 
processing and learning, expression of emotions and 
attitudes, impression formation and management, 
relational communication, deception, social 
influence, and the structuring and regulation 
of interaction. (Burgoon, 1985, p.382)
(see Footnote 16)
Such categories might be useful to future researchers 
in developing transformations of usage from the basic simple 
structure. In his early work, Chomsky (1957) identified
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many transformation rules for the English language. Similar 
transformation rules may be identified for nonverbal 
language. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to 
uncover all nonverbal transformational rules, but to 
establish the foundation for the basic structure of 
nonverbal meaning from which nonverbal transformation rules 
may be derived.
The fact is that the verbal language is the main tool 
used by researchers, and especially linguistic researchers 
who have carried the burden of most of the research in child 
language (Ochs, 1988). However, linguistic research, 
although it has uncovered and analyzed the underlying system 
of rules which govern the formation of sentences by speakers 
of the language, has not considered nonverbal behavior as 
part of the language. Knapp, Wiemann, & Daly (1978) remind 
us that verbal and nonverbal communication are parts of the 
same system.
While some behaviors may seem less integrated 
than others, verbal and nonverbal behavior are 
unquestionably part and parcel of the same overall 
system of communication. Separation may be 
intellectually comforting to those who find too much 
complexity in the larger system, but we must 
constantly recognize the artificiality and potential 
distortion brought about by the separation.^® (p.272)
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The sentence, as defined above, is one constant decoding 
device which can be applied to all nonverbal behavior and is 
known to all researchers and speakers of English. Since 
children themselves facilitate the original translations of 
verbal language from nonverbal (as will be shown in 
Carroll’s C19863 theory), an experience which cannot usually 
be recalled by adult speakers, applying the basic language 
of children and adults, the simple sentence, seems 
appropriate to capture meaning.
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Language Acquisition and Communication Theories
Researchers have been fascinated with child language 
for many years. There is a long history of research, and 
sources are abundant for the study of verbal language. The
research begins with the study of vocabulary growth and
expands to include more and more aspects such as the 
structure of language and the pragmatic use of language.
Most recently, the inclusion of context has become an 
important feature of the study of language and communication
development (Ochs, 1988; Vorobey, 1989). An overview of the
developmental studies will be presented including those 
reported by Knapp and Hall (1992) with a report on pertinent 
aspects from the theory of Ochs (1988), White (1982), and 
Carroll (1986). Vygotsky (1962) and Hirsh-Pasek and 
Golinkoff (1991) will be offered as foundational support for 
sign-sentences.
All of the theories presented offer a wealth of 
knowledge concerning language and communication; however, 
none offer a satisfactory explanation of the origin of 
language or communication. Chomsky (1957) provides for the 
innateness of language. Crain (1992, p.362,369) explains 
Chomsky's (1972, p.171;1980, pp.232-34) innateness 
hypothesis:
Chomsky says that the linguistic accomplishments
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of the ordinary child are too great to be explained in 
terms of any kind of input from the environment. 
Children hear only a limited body of speech, much of 
which is poorly formed, yet they rapidly and uniformly 
develop an intricate system of rules for creating an 
unlimited number of sentences. Their knowledge extends 
far beyond their experience. One can only conclude, 
Chomsky says, that children do not build grammars 
primarily from the evidence they hear, but according to 
an inner design— a genetic program...When children 
master a grammar, they are guided by an innate 
knowledge of "universal grammar;" they automatically 
know the general form that any language must 
take...Thus, children need information from the 
environment to...determine which rule their particular 
language follows. .. As they put words together, they 
must intuitively know that certain combinations are 
possible and others are not. If children lacked this 
knowledge, if they had to learn grammar primarily from 
experience, they could never master such a complex 
system in so short a time... Chomsky also postulates 
(1980, Ch 6; 1983, p.37> (that) the child's capacity to 
learn languages is species-specific (found only in 
humans) and is a highly specialized faculty within the 
human mind. That is, it is quite unlike the faculty 
for learning science, music, and so on. It has its own
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genetic design...Although children master most aspects 
of grammar by the age of five or six years, some of 
the most complex transformations are still beyond 
their grasp. For example, they seem to have difficulty 
with the passive voice until age seven or so (Turner
and Rommetveit, 1967). The years five to 10 may be
important for the acquisition of the subtlest and 
most complex grammatical skills (C. Chomsky, 1969).
(see Footnote 1)
There is evidence that children do set some parameters 
in learning language (Hyams, 1986) and do seem to have built
in constraints in using transformational rules (Crain &
Nakayama, 1987). However, Chomsky’s theory does not deal 
with the pragmatic use of language, and as Littlejohn (1983) 
points out, "Even if basic language mechanisms are innate, 
we are far from understanding their nature or how they 
operate” (p.85). It seems that there is still much to learn 
about the origin of language.
Nonverbal origins are more well-defined. Ekman and 
Friesen (1969) define three types of origins of nonverbal 
behavior:
One origin of nonverbal behavior is a relationship 
between stimulus events and nonverbal activity which is 
built into the nervous system of every intact member of 
the species. A reflex is the most obvious example, and 
some authors have argued that facial expressions of
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emotion are also based upon inherited neurological 
programs.
A second origin is experience common to all 
members of the species; this differs from the first 
origin in that one need not assume that the nonverbal 
behavior is inherited, but rather that it is acquired 
as part of the species-constant experience of the human 
equipment interacting with almost any environment. For 
example, regardless of culture, the hands will be used, 
with or without an implement, to place food in the 
mouth.
A third origin of nonverbal behavior is experience 
which varies with culture, class, family, or 
individual. Some nonverbal behaviors are learned as 
part of an instrumental task in which the goal is 
mastery of a particular activity such as farming, 
driving, swimming,and in learning particular styles of 
eating,defecating, etc. Other nonverbal acts are 
learned as part of a social interaction, where the goal 
is the establishment or maintenence of a type of social 
interaction. Some nonverbal behaviors are learned 
explicitly with conscious attention from learner and 
tutor, or from only the learner; others are acquired 
more implicitly with less focus upon the acquisition 
process. Imitating the posture or facial expression of 
a favorite movie star may be quite explicit and
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practiced, while the acquisition of the posture or 
other movements of the same—sex parent may occur with 
less awareness on the part of the learner. Imitation 
can also be relevant to learning NOT to resemble 
another person’s nonverbal behavior. The parent can 
explicitly caution the child about not talking with his 
hands or to smile when uncle and aunt visit; or the 
parental reinforcements can be more subtle, with 
neither child nor parent specifically aware of the 
reinforcement contingency, (p. 59) (See Footnote 14)
It appears that the origin of the essence of basic 
sentential knowledge is from the first type and is tied to 
the needs of the infant experiencing emotional distress or 
fulfillment and the resulting display and commuinication 
with caregivers. In light of the affect display studies of 
Ekman and Friesen (1969), as well as those of Pitcairn & 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1976) and Eibl—Eibesfeldt (1987), together 
with the language learning studies with apes (Leiberman,
1984; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991) and, of course, the studies of 
Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff (1991), I believe that 
comprehension of basic sentential meaning is almost 
certainly inherited phylogenetically.
The more complex transforming ability to generate an 
endless number of sentences or "surface structures" seems 
more appropriately to be assigned to origins of the second 
type. For, as Bruner (1983) says, when a child is born into
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a culture s/he has a "committment" to the maxims or rules of 
that culture. Although Bruner was speaking about the 
pragmatics of language use, initially we are "committed" to 
speaking the language of our environmment, and since the 
human species is the only one that transforms sentences, 
this ability may be inherited ontogenetically.
The other rules and knowledge of the culture that are 
so closely bound to the use of language in practice would 
have to be considered as the origin of the third type. Here 
we find the building up of vocabulary, the meanings of 
words, the understanding of all aspects of the cultural 
context (Ochs, 1988)
White’s (1982) theory will be offered as a theory which 
can provide the basic foundation for the origin of nonverbal 
communication with Carroll’s (1986) theory showing the 
developmental extension to verbal language. Pertinent points 
from the writings of Vygotsky (1934/1962) as well as a 
report of a study by Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff (1991) will 
complete the review to provide evidence of support for Sign- 
sentence theory translating or decoding nonverbal behavior 
to reveal the verbal understanding which nonverbal behavior 
exhibits, thus bringing nonverbal behavior into its proper 
perspective as communication.
Ô3
Developmental Theories 
Ingram (1989) describes early accounts of language 
development which began in 1875 as diaries of researchers 
who were also parents. Charles Darwin among others kept a 
parental diary on the language of his son which he reported 
in the journal Mind. This era of "baby biographies” 
continued until 1926 when sample studies began. These 
studies, which concentrated on vocabulary growth, sentence 
length, and correctness of articulation, ended in 1957. The 
studies measured large samples of up to 173 subjects and 
resulted in average measurements such as the mean sentence 
length for different age groups. In 1957, longitudinal 
studies began with selected subjects and taped observations 
recording small samples with a minimum of three children.
The goal of language acquisition research was to establish 
how the child acquires rules of sentence formation. This 
was the result of the publication of Chomsky’s (1957) 
Syntactic Structures. This new theory of transformational 
grammar stimulated research on syntax. Chomsky defined 
grammar as a set of rules for generating all the grammatical 
sentences of a language. He distinguished between the 
"competence" of a speaker and the "performance.” The rules 
of grammar which describe language are rules of the 
"competence" of a speaker, not "performance." Chomsky was 
very critical of language research that revealed linguisitic 
competence of children based on language samples alone. He
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called for other kinds of observation of children’s 
abilities and comprehension in many different kinds of 
circumstances. Current research reviews usually begin with 
this 1957 period.
A comprehensive overview of research on the development 
of spoken language is given by Garton and Pratt (1989) 
beginning with a differentiation of the behaviorist 
(Skinner, 1957) and nativist (Chomsky, 1957) views. Also 
outlined are other aspects such as adult assistance in 
learning language (Cazden, 1983), ’’Motherese”
(Gleitman,Newport, & Gleitman, 1984), and learning problems, 
such as ambiguity in messages (Robinson & Robinson, 1977, 
1978, 1981; Robinson & Whittaker, 1987).
Golinkoff and Gordon (1983) begin their review of 
language development with Chomsky (1957) and with 
Lenneberg’s (1967) theory of critical periods. Included are 
semantics studies (e.g.. Bloom, 1970), constructivist theory 
(Piaget, 1951), the pragmatic approach (e.g., Searle, 1969), 
and the social and communicative interaction found in the 
functionl approach (e.g.,Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975). 
They conclude with the socio-cultural findings of Ochs 
(1982) and a revival of the nativist approach applied to the 
field of artificial intelligence and computational 
linguistics (Pinker, 1979).
Knapp and Hall (1992, p.211) report on the seemingly 
inborn sensitivity to language by citing the study of
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Infants by Condon and Sander (1974) which found babies 12 
hours old whose head, hands, elbows, hips, and leg movements 
tended to correspond to the rhythms of human speech.
When the babies were exposed to disconnected speech 
or to plain tapping sounds, however, the rhythmic 
pattern was not observed. If this finding is validated 
by other researchers, it may mean that an infant has 
participated in and laid the groundwork for various 
linguistic forms and structures long before formal 
language learning begins. (See Bernieri, Reznick and 
Rosenthal, 1988.)’®
Knapp and Hall also present photographs from videotape 
recordings of two- to three-week old infants imitating 
facial expressions of an experimenter from a study by 
Meltzoff and Moore (1977). Knapp and Hall report:
Newborns seem to have the facial muscle actions 
necessary to express virtually all basic affect 
display of adults (Oster & Ekman, 1978). Do newborns 
show affect displays resembling those of adults? Yes, 
but more rigorous research is needed. Individual parts 
of various facial displays have been extensively 
studied, e.g., smiling, frowning, brow knitting, and 
crying. But these studies typically do not consider 
the whole facial expression, nor do they provide the 
kind of fine-grained observations that might, for 
example, distinguish expressions associated with
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different types of infant cries. One line of research, 
however, suggests that the early ability to imitate 
adult expressions (and possibly other behaviors as 
well) may be inherited and may ultimately play a role 
in the development of various facial displays.
In the late 1970’s, Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 
1983a, 1983b) demonstrated that twelve to twenty-one- 
day-old infants imitated adults who performed four 
actions: tongue protrusion, mouth opening, lip 
protrusion, and sequential finger movement.
Subsequent research replicated the finding for tongue 
protrusion and mouth opening for neonates 0.7 to 71 
hours old. Their experiments seem to negate 
explanations for such behavior based on innate 
releasing mechanisms similar to those found in many 
animals and the learning processes based on caregiver 
behavior. Instead, they argue that infants are born 
with the ability to use what they call "intermodal 
equivalencies,” which means that the infant is able to 
use the "equivalence between the act seen and the act 
done as the fundamental basis for generating the 
behavioral match. Perception and production, then, are 
closely linked and mediated by a common 
representational system from birth, (pp.431-432)
(see Footnote 19)
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Knapp and Hall report on further infant findings which 
show that infants are born with the ability to discriminate 
and imitate happy, sad, and surprised facial expression as 
well as disgust (Rosenstein & Oster, 1981). He expresses 
concern that if imitation plays a role in the development 
and refinement of facial affect displays, there is more to 
learn about similar show of affect display in congenitally 
blind children such as those studied by Eibl-Eibesfeldt 
(1973, 1975). Pitcairn & Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1976) concluded 
that the spontaneous expressions of sadness, crying, 
laughing, smiling, pouting, anger, surprise, and fear are 
not significantly different in blind/deaf children. Also, 
refusal behavior was similar to that of sighted children. 
Even thalidomide babies who had no arms and other 
handicapped children show similar expression.
Knapp and Hall also point out similarities in facial 
displays to primate relatives during similar activities such 
as play or aggression. Pitcairn and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1976) 
observed the eye behavior of adult human beings, human 
infants and children, blind persons, and nonhuman primates 
in greeting rituals and found remarkable similarities. 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s studies led him to label "basic 
interaction strategies” in several different cultures with 
common rules that relate to dominance (and the fear of it) 
and bonding affiliation (and the fear of it) as the root of 
human behavioral displays (nonverbal and verbal), whether in
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greeting, crying to block aggression, getting the focus of 
attention, or persuading a partner to give you something. 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1987):
acknowledges that cultural teachings and 
environmental factors may play an enormous role in 
making these strategies seem very different in one 
culture and another. Still, his observations of 
children in various cultures leads him to state:
”Ve can assume there exists a system of universal 
rules that structure social interactions, verbal 
and nonverbal alike. These rules could be rooted 
in certain panhuman dispositions that channel the 
acquisition of norms, and some norms may even be 
encoded in reference patterns given to us as 
phylogenetic adaptations.”
(Knapp & Hall, 1991, p.423). (see Footnote 19) 
Ekman and Friesen (1969) report a universal association 
between particular facial muscular patterns and discrete 
emotions. However, the evoking stimuli, the linked effects, 
the display rules, and the behavioral consequences all can 
vary enormously from one culture to another.
Sources for verbal development greatly outnumber those 
for nonverbal development (Allen, 1981; Feldman, 1982;
Ziajka, 1981). A comprehensive coverage of mothei— infant 
interaction is given by Vorobey (1989). Vorobey details the 
stages of the development of communication in the infant. A
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close examination of these stages is useful here to give 
developmental background for the beginning of human 
communication.
Stage one; Regulation
This stage begins with the infant’s cry which brings the 
mother. The child is becoming "self-regulated" to periods 
of comfort and discomfort, and the parent is becoming 
accustomed to the cries of the infant. By two months, the 
infant is alert, smiling, and using eye contact more 
regularly. The infant mirrors these behaviors of the 
parent.
Stage two: Reciprocity
By three months, crying declines. The mother and child bid 
for one another’s attention with widened eyes, smiles, and 
vocalization. Cooing elicits words from the parent in 
interaction. The parent is still in control in initiating 
participation of the infant.
Stage Three: Initiation
By seven months, face-to-face games are given up. The 
infant begins to initiate social activity and indicate 
preferences with advances in babbling and reaching. The 
infant directs his/her mother’s gaze to objects. The mother 
replies with comments. Games such as pat-a-cake are 
mutually enjoyed by infant and parent. The mother assumes a 
didactic role as the use of imitation by the infant becomes 
prominent.
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Stage four: Intention
The child’s interest turns to exploration as s/he 
approaches one year old and s/he begins to locomote. The 
mother names objects, and the child’s first word emerges. 
Mother and child experience shared language and 
intersubjectivity. Interaction is no longer controlled by 
the parent. Vorobey concludes that not only interaction, 
but also context may be an intervening variable in 
communication. The language in context is the main focus in 
the theory of Ochs (1988)
The Theory of Ochs 
Declaring that research is still a long way from 
accounting for how children conceptualize events, states, 
objects, or persons, Ochs (1988) points out that much less 
is understood about children’s concepts of affect, social 
acts, social activities, social events, or social 
relationships or how these relate to language. Ochs (1988) 
has defined discourse as a ’’set of norms, preferences, and 
expectations relating language to context, which speaker—  
hearers draw on and modify in producing and making sense out 
of language in context.”
Knowledge of discourse is a part of our linguistic 
competence, but at the same time such knowledge is part 
of our sociocultural competence. This means that 
children developing discourse knowledge are developing
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a knowledge of both language and c u l t u r e . ( p . 222)
A key focus of the language theory of Ochs is that, 
through communication between a member of the culture and a 
novice, the change that impacts the process is not always 
just toward the novice, but impacts the joint activity and 
the member as well. "In this sense, caregivers may be 
socialized by the children they are socializing. Teachers 
as well may be socialized by the students they are inducting 
into some area of expertise. Their understanding of the 
subject matter may be transformed by the responses and 
questions of the students." Ochs believes that it is 
important to recognize this bidirectionality in spite of the 
asymmetry which may exist between novice and member.
Chaos theory (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) is offered by 
Ochs as a foundational theory which views disorder as 
leading to new dynamic states following a state of 
instability or chaos.
Vhile I am not suggesting that social 
relationships are inherently chaotic, I do advocate 
the idea that the structures of knowledge of both 
member and novice are vulnerable and that 
communication between them may lead to what Prigogine 
and others call "far from equilibrium" conditions for 
both, which in turn lead to new organizations of 
knowledge for both. (p.227) (see Footnote 20)
72
Even though Ochs does not exclude unidirectional impact 
from member to novice, recognizing the social and 
psychological dominance of the member over the novice and 
constraints on thought and behavior, her theory allows for 
members' knowledge to be impacted by novices through the 
medium of social activity and for social activity to alter 
biological and psychological parameters over evolutionary 
time. Both member and novice are active, interactive, and 
vulnerable to change. White’s (1982) theory provides a 
biological origin of this interaction.
White’s theory 
White’s (1982) theory provides a model for biological 
and nonverbal processes. This phase theory defines a 
foundation for the claim that nonverbal communication is 
basic and vital to verbal communication. Using the 
commonalities of human and nonhuman infant behavior. White 
divides social development into three phases according to 
who initiates the interaction. A fourth phase is added for 
human children.
The First Three Phases- '
Phase I mothei---------- >young (mother initiating)
Phase II mother< >young (mutual approach)
Phase III mother<--------- young (child initiating)
In the first phase, the mother is extremely attentive, 
initiating social behavior (first three to four months). In
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phase two, the child begins to locomote. As s/he begins to 
walk, s/he begins to talk. White believes that speech is 
developed to fill the need of the child to remain attached 
to the parent and still explore the environment. Both 
parent and child initiate behavior. Speech fills this need 
to remain "attached" from a distance. As the child moves 
into phase III, s/he becomes very demanding of the mother 
and she initiates most social behavior. Separation is very 
frustrating. Mother begins to respond less postively. 
Nonhuman organisms reject their young at this time, begin 
weaning, etc. This is the last phase for nonhuman 
organisms.
The Fourth Phase
As the human child learns more about the environment, 
s/he becomes more positive and is not frightened by 
separation. Mother becomes more positive. This is a 
renegotiation phase, or phase IV where mother and child 
renegotiate to begin the phase pattern over again.
White believes that the child is forced into speech 
because of this renegotiation motivated by the child’s 
desires for more freedom, more knowledge of the world, and 
more control. This begins a cyclic pattern for the child: 
as s/he desires more interaction, s/he develops more speech 
for further negotiation.
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Vhile White’s theory is a theory of animal behavior, we 
can see that its proposals are supported in a very general 
way by the observations of Ilg and Ames (1955) at the 
Gessell Institute: children go through patterned periods of 
equilibrium and disequilibrium, cycles of positive, then 
”breaking-up” behavior throughout their development. Arnold 
Gesell (1946) and his associates began collecting data at 
the former Clinic of Child Development in the School of 
Medicine at Yale University with a sample of 50 children 
examined at 5, 5 1/2, 6, 7, 8, and 9 years of age. The 
children were of high average or superior intelligence from 
families of upper or middle socio-economic status. Three- 
fourths of the children had attended the guidance nursery of 
the clinic; some had also been examined during infancy. 
Nearly all attended a public elementary school. Case 
records for each child included (a) a psychological 
examination based on the Yale developmental schedules and 
Stanford Binet scale; (b) performance tests (e.g., the 
Arthur series); (c) reading readiness tests; (d) visual
skills tests; (e) naturalistic observations of the child’s 
play behavior; and (f) a wide-ranging interview with the 
mother concerning behavior at home and school. Children were 
also observed in their classrooms and their teachers were 
interviewed. From these clinical studies, records were 
analyzed to reveal a gradient of growth still used today by 
child development consultants and child care experts.
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Although the concept of growth stages is not new 
(Erickson, 1952; Freud, 1949), the work of the Gesell 
Institute focuses on the contrast of behaviors that take 
place in the life of an individual child (Ilg & Ames, 1955)
"Better" or "worse" behavior tends to alternate 
with the ages in a fairly lawful sequence of 
unfolding. There is a second, equally rhythmic 
alternation. Too concentrated or "focal" 
behavior, as we call it, at one time, is followed 
by too diffuse, widespread, or "peripheral" 
behavior at a succeeding time. A good example 
of focal behavior is seen in the average 5-year—  
old who tends to hug his mother’s skirts, to 
shadow her wherever she goes. Six, in 
contrast, is a peripheral stage. He may be all 
over the neighborhood, never at home, always 
ready for new places, people, experiences. It is 
the task of growth eventually to help the 
individual to be neither one extreme nor the 
other but to intermesh these extremes.-- (p.7)
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The Development of White’s Theory
White (1978) generalized from the studies of mammals, 
whose young are born dependent upon the mother, that 
behavior is expressed by certain behavioral patterns. 
Although the time course differs (weeks, months, or years, 
depending on the animal in question) , the pattern is the 
same. Drawing on the work of Hinde and Spencei— Booth 
(1967), Rheingold (1963), Rosenblatt and Lehrman (1963), 
Schneirla and Rosenblatt (1961), and Schneirla, Rosenblatt, 
and Tobach (1963), White developed the phase theory reviewed 
above (White, 1982). Four aspects of this theory are:
(1) Biologically, humans have a long infancy period.
(2) Adequate development during this period requires 
involvement in complex social interactions 
(Neonates who are abandoned, simply do not 
survive.)
(3) The interactions in which infants engage are the 
basis for normal communication and, ultimately, 
language.
(4) Anything that disrupts these interactions may 
disrupt communicative functioning and, 
ultimately, language.
(White, 1984a, p.2)
White has followed these theoretical concepts in her work 
with intervention programs for deaf children (e.g.. White
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1980, 1984b). In extending White's model to include
the specific detail of development of the individual child, 
the research of Carroll (1986) is a logical point of 
continuation. White’s theory provides generally for the 
origin of nonverbal communication and its development into 
the verbal phase, but it does not provide specificallly for 
this. There is an important connection between White’s 
theory and Carroll’s (1986) because, unknown to the 
theorists themselves, Carroll (1986) has identified specific 
behaviors which transform nonverbal communication to verbal 
to give support to White’s theory (1978).
Carroll’s Theory 
Carroll (1986) has shown that infants extend their 
communication naturally from nonverbal communication, to 
partly nonverbal and partly verbal, to verbal. Carroll 
contends that formulating messages that are congruent with 
the given information of listeners is part of learning to 
communicate effectively. To explain the aspect of 
congruence in the infant’s communication, Carroll divides 
each of four stages into the ’’given information” already 
known by the adult listener and ’’new information” added by 
the infant.
First Stage
The child in the first stage points to an object that 
an adult is already looking at (’’given information” ) or 
waits for the adult to attend to the object on which s/he
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wants to ’’comment.” Then, the child points to the object, 
making a ’’comment” or ’’assertion” nonverbally (’’new 
information”). Carroll labels this first stage as the 
beginning of intentional communication which occurs when 
children apply their understanding of means/end 
relationships to social goals. Early prelinguistic gestures 
have been studied (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975) which 
focus on two communicative acts: ’’assertions,” the use of an 
object as a means of obtaining adult attention, and 
’’requests,” the use of adults as means to an object. An 
example of a nonverbal request would be a child’s looking 
intently at the adult from whom s/he is trying to take an 
object, whereas if the child attempts to take the object 
from the adult without ’’looking intently,” the adult is 
unyielding. This stage occurs by 10 to 12 months of age. 
Second Stage
In the second stage, the ’’given information” is still 
nonverbal, such as pointing to a shoe lying underneath a 
bed. The child may then give the ’’new information” 
verbally, ’’bed.” Carroll stipulates that children use 
verbal encoding of new information with nonverbal encoding 
of given information by the end of their second year 
(Greenfield & Zukow, 1978).
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Third Stage
The third stage Involves the child’s calling attention 
to an object verbally, e.g. ’’cat,” and also adding the new 
information verbally, e.g. ”hat” (The cat has a hat.)
Example: Child: Cat (looking at book)
Mother: Hm?
Child: Cat (pointing to picture)
Mother : Cat !
Child: Hat!
Mother: Hat, yeah. The cat has a hat. 
Carroll reports that it is common for children at the one- 
word stage to express both forms of information in verbal 
form, using a previous utterance as given information and 
the new utterance as new information (Clark & Clark, 1977; 
Greenfield & Smith, 1976; Scollon, 1976).
Fourth Stage
In the fourth stage, two words are combined into one 
’’sentence,” e.g. ’’Cat hat.” or Water more.”
Results of Carroll’s Study
Although these expressions are not complete sentences 
in the formal grammatical sense, they may be translated as 
the mother did in the example above. All of these examples 
show that children do understand and communicate complete 
statements before they are able to express them verbally.
As they mature linguistically, they, themselves, translate
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to verbal statements those which they fomerly expressed 
nonverbally. In stage three above, the translation becomes 
part of the nonverbal statements in the verbal/nonverbal 
transaction. First, the deictic behavior of pointing to an 
object is used by the infant to translate the picture of a 
cat into the verbal label, "cat." The total statement seems 
to be saying, "I'm pointing to the cat.” Second, upon 
hearing the mother's response, verifying that she has 
received the message element, "cat," the procedure is 
repeated for "hat," timed immediately while the mother's 
attention and eye gaze are still focused. Her response of 
"hat" seems to be saying, " I see you are pointing to the 
hat." This facilitates the mother’s final translation,
"The cat has a hat." The content of this final verbal 
sentence of the mother’s, "The cat has a hat." concerns the 
environmental context, which early speech acts usually do, 
and the encoding of this verbal information would not be 
possible without the statements sent through the nonverbal 
behavior. This whole interchange was initiated and carried 
through by a communicator who speaks in one-word utterances.
Analyses as the one above provide observable evidence 
of the fact that the child translates nonverbal statements 
to verbal statements, and it appears that translations 
from nonverbal to verbal statements are not only possible 
but are inherent in the language development of the child.
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This is the underlying rationale of the Sign-sentence 
theory, (see Appendix B for Developmental Path Chart)
aiiTtiTtiarv of White's and Carroll's Theories
White has shown that nonverbal communication is 
exhibited in lower mammals through the same patterns of 
development which extend phylogenetically to human infants. 
She theorizes that verbal language is a direct extension of 
this nonverbal communication.
Carroll’s study supports White’s theory by providing a 
concrete, observable example of the fact that verbal 
behavior develops directly from nonverbal behavior.
Carroll’s study shows that nonverbal communication and 
verbal communication are indeed part and parcel of the same 
phenomenon. The child begins communicating nonverbally and 
translates his/her nonverbal statements to verbal statements 
as he/she develops language and verbal communication.
Vygotsky
The writings of Vygotsky were banned in Russia in 1936 
shortly after his death and are still being translated to 
generate new ideas and concepts in child development (Crain, 
1992). Vygotsky (1934/1962) points out the similarities in 
language development between chimpanzees and human beings 
from his study of Koehler’s (1925) work.
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The chimpanzee is an extremely gregarious animal 
and réponds strongly to the presence of others of his 
kind. Koehler describes highly diversified forms of 
"linguistic communication" among chimpanzees. First 
in line is their vast repertory of affective 
expressions: facial play, gestures, vocalization;
next come the movements expressing social emotions: 
gestures of greeting, etc. The apes are capable both 
of "understanding" one another’s gestures and of 
"expressing," through gestures, desires involving 
other animals. Usually a chimpanzee will begin a 
movement or an action he wants another animal to 
perform or to share— e.g., will push him and 
execute the initial movements of walking when he 
wants the other to give him a banana. All these 
are gestures "directly" related to the action itself...
By and large, these observations confirm Wundt’s 
(1900) opinion that pointing gestures, the first stage 
in the development of human speech, do not yet appear 
in animals, but that some gestures of apes are a 
transitional form between grasping and pointing (p.219) 
We consider this transitional gesture a most important 
step from unadulterated affective expression toward 
objective l a n g u a g e . ( p . 34-35)
However, Vygotsky did not believe that anthropoids could 
obtain "objective language" because evidence had shown that
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they did not represent any objective meaning in their art 
work, for instance, when Koehler (1925) was working with 
them. He also saw similarity in affective expression.
The coincidence of sound production with affective 
gestures, especially noticeable when the chimpanzees 
are very excited,is not limited to anthropoids—  
it is, on the contrary, very common among animals 
endowed with voice. Human speech certainly 
originated in the same kind of expressive vocal 
reactions.
...But it is not connected with intellectual reactions, 
i.e., with thinking. (p.40) (see Footnote 23) 
Vygotsky summarizes his study of anthropoids:
We undertook this analysis of several studies of 
ape language and intellect to elucidate the 
relationship between thinking and speech in the 
phylogentic development of these functions. We 
can now summarize our conclusions, which will be 
of use in the further analysis of the problem.
1. Thought and speech have different genetic
roots.
2. The two functions develop along different 
lines and independently of each other.
3. There is no clear-cut and constant 
correlation between them.
4. Anthropoids display an intellect somewhat
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like man’s in ’’certain respects” <the embryonic 
use of tools) and a language somewhat like 
man’s ”in totaly different respects” (the 
phonetic aspect of their speech, its release 
function, the beginning of a social function).
5. The close correspondence between thought and 
speech characteristic of man is absent in 
anthropoids.
6. In the phylogeny of thought and speech, a 
prelinguistic phase in the development of 
thought and a preintellectual phase in the 
development of speech are clearly 
discernible. (p.41) (see Footnote 23)
The preintellectual phase of speech observed in the 
anthropoids are identified in the human newborn child as 
babbling, crying, social reactions to voice, laughter, 
inarticulate sounds, movements, and first words. This phase 
continues until about the second year of life when the child 
discovers that objects have names.
Before the turning point, the child does (like some 
animals) recognize a small number of words 
which substitute, as in conditioning, for objects 
persons, actions, state, or desires. At that age 
the child knows only the word supplied to him by 
other people. Now the situation changes; The 
child feels the need for words and, through his
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questions, actively tries to learn the signs 
attached to objects. He seems to have discovered 
the symbolic function of words. Speech which in 
the earlier stage was affective-conative, now enters 
the intellectual phase. The lines of speech and 
thought development have met. (p.43) (see Footnote 23) 
The ontogenetic development of the human child is 
summarized by Vygotsky as follows:
In other words, speech cannot be ’’discovered” 
without thinking.
In brief, we must conclude that:
1. In their ontogenetic development, thought and 
speech have different roots.
2. In the speech development of the child, we can 
with certainty establish a preintellectual 
stage, and in his thought development, a 
prelinguistic stage.
3. Up to a certain point in time, the two follow 
different lines, independently of each other.
4. At a certain point these lines meet, whereupon 
thought becomes verbal and speech rational, (p.44)
(see Footnote 23)
Until recently, these views or similar ones have seemed 
to predominate the thinking of language developmentalists. 
However, with the new evidence of Savage-Rumbaugh (1991), it 
can now be seen that the language of apes is not constrained
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as Vygotsky states. By supplying the same negotiation of 
cultural contexts as those of human children, the apes have 
aquired symbolic markers. An example of a routine is given 
by Savage-Rumbaugh (1991):
(An) example is the "going outdoors routine." As 
this routine is initiated, the chimpanzee may be 
asked to retrieve a shirt to wear outdoors. After 
this routine is well established and the components 
are behaviorally anticipated by the chimp, the 
routine will be initiated only by symbolic markers 
(or words). If the chimpanzee does not link these 
vocal markers to the next expected component of the 
"going outdoors routine," it will not respond. The 
caretaker then will produce more elaborate and 
direct action-based markers, such as looking toward 
the shirts, putting a shirt in the chimp's hand, and, 
if necessary, returning to the original action of 
the routine, that of putting the shirt on the 
chimp.(p.219) (see Footnote 9)
Routines and their symbolic markers are naturally 
interdigitated because components of one routine 
invariably are used in a different manner in other 
routines. As the routines and symbolic markers 
overlap, the referent of these markers is made 
increasingly specific and becomes divorced from 
its original context.
87
...When comprehension of symbolic vocal, gestural, 
and lexical markers becomes fully separated from the 
routine, the chimpanzee can pass formal tests of word 
recognition and can pair spoken words with their 
lexical and photographic equivalents. He or she also 
can answer simple questions about these vocal and 
lexical symbols. (p.231) (see Footnote 9)
Vygotsky considered that perhaps chimpanzees could 
acquire language, and even while drawing conclusions as he 
did, was still concerrned that no researchers had been able 
to produce adequate training for this.
Language does not of necessity depend on sound.
If it is true that the chimpanzee has the 
intellect for acquiring something analogous to 
human language, and the whole trouble lies 
in his lacking vocal imitativeness, then he 
should be able, in experiments, to master some 
conventional gestures whose psychological function 
would be exactly the same as that of conventional 
sounds....The medium is beside the point: what
matters is the ’’functional use of signs,” any signs 
that could play a role corresponding to that of 
human speech. (p.38) (see Footnote 23)
Vygotsky also did acknowledge that the nonverbal 
gestures of the child precede verbal communication and are 
meaningful. In his evaluation of Stern’s (1928) work.
8 8
Vygotsky faults Stern (1928) for translating a child’s first 
word, ’’Mama,” into ’’Mama, put me in the chair.” (Stern, 1928,
p. 180):
When we observe the child in action, however, it 
becomes obvious that it is not only the word 
"mama” which means, say, "Mama, put me in the 
chair," but the child’s whole behavior at that 
moment (his reaching out toward the chair, 
trying to hold on to it, etc.)...the only 
correct translation of "mama," or of any other 
words, is the pointing gesture. The word, at 
first, is a conventional substitute for the 
gesture; it appears long before the child’s 
crucial "discovery of language" ( Vygotsky, 1934/1962, 
p.31). (see Footnote 23)
But this is where modern research can add additional 
knowledge to the theory of Vygotsky. He could not have known 
the actual extent of the child’s comprehension of language 
long before the child verbalizes sentences. Chomsky (1957) 
first theorized the difference between the child’s 
performance of language in simple sentences at around the age 
of three years of age and the internal understanding of those 
sentences before that time. Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff (1991) 
have shown that, indeed, children as young as 12 months of 
age do possess comprehension of language. They call their
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study "The Preferential Looking Paradigm." The first subjects 
were 16 infants (half boys, half girls), mean age 14 months.
The Preferential Looking ParadiemP^
The rationale of the Preferential Looking Paradigm is 
that children will be drawn to look at a television picture 
screen that is consistent with a linguistic message rather 
than one that is inconsistent if they understand the language 
used. The infant is held on the mother’s lap in front of and 
midway between two television monitors. A central speaker is 
placed between the two monitors to deliver linguistic 
descriptions. After a familiarization process, the infant’s 
task is to match the linguistic description to the 
appropriate television monitor.
The familiarization process proceeds as follows:
1. Each picture is shown alone one after another When 
one goes off, the other comes on. There is a 
"nondescript" audio message from the central 
speaker; for example, "Vhat is she doing?" The 
picture of a girl kissing keys and holding a ball in 
the foreground is shown on one monitor, and the girl 
kissing the ball and holding keys in the foreground 
is shown on the other monitor. Each picture lasts 
for six seconds.
2. A center light comes on for three seconds.
3. Both screens come on together with a "nondescript"
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audio, "Vhat are they doing?”
In these three first steps, the child learns that both 
screens can be shown, and that they can be shown at the same 
time.
The test trial follows:
4. The center light comes on with a linguistic
stimulus, "Hey, she’s kissing the keys.
Where is she kissing the keys (or ball)?"
5. Test: showing both screens with linguistic 
stimulus, "Hey, she’s kissing the keys.
Where is she kissing the keys (or ball)?
There are controls built into the activity. The mother 
wears a visor over her eyes so that she cannot see the 
stimuli and unwittingly signal the child. The observers who 
are recording the eye fixations from behind the screens are 
blind to the experimental condition. Reliability for the 
measurement of visual fixation has been obtained between two 
on-line observers, between two off-line observers (coding 
from videotape taken of subjects during testing), and between 
one on-line and one off-line observer. In all conditions, 
reliability exceeds .90.
Another control in the desisgn is that the actors or 
objects are in constant motion so that the child cannot use 
activity alone to provide a strategic solution to the mapping 
between the language and the scene. Colors and shapes are 
balanced as much as possible on both screens. Also, the
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tapes are shown in both video decks so that half the subjects
see the matches on one pattern and the other half see the
opposite pattern. Half the subjects hear an audio tape that 
matches one member of a video pair; and the audio matches the
opposite member of the pair for the other half of the
subj ects.
The independent variables in this design are the 
linguistic stimuli (always complete grammatical sentences), 
the side of the match (countez— balanced across tapes and 
subjects), and sometimes age. The dependent variables are:
(a) the amount of visual fixation time to the matching versus 
the nonmatching screen and <b) the latency or time to look at 
the matching or the nonmatching screen. Latency is 
calculated from the time that children look at the center 
light between the two screens until they look toward one of 
the video screens.
The results show the mean visual fixation time to the 
match was 2.90 sec and to the nonmatch, 2.15 sec (p < .05). 
The authors conclude that these infants, who are all in the 
one-word stage of language production, are predisposed to 
organize their input into packages of words that represent 
relationships. It is reasoned that if the infants did not 
comprehend the sentence, they would distribute their 
attention equally between the two screens. If the strategy 
of focusing selectively on the last word were used, the 
infants should actually look at the incorrect screen because
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the object represented by the last word is foregrounded on 
the nonmatching screen.
Two more experiments were done with the Preferential 
Looking Paradign. In all three instances, the results 
provide compelling evidence that the comprehension of 
syntactic forms precedes production of those forms of speech. 
Vhat would this knowledge have meant to Vygotsky?
The Preferential Looking Paradigm’s Relation to Vygotsky
Had Vygotsky realized the comprehension of verbal 
language infants attain before they begin to speak in 
sentences, he no doubt would have advocated translating not a 
single word backward to a pointing gesture, but the pointing 
gesture as well as other communicative behavior into 
verbalization. Indeed, he did admit that a message was 
provided by the child through his/her movements rather than a 
single word. Therefore, since the semantics for beginning 
language is dictated by the practice of the child’s culture 
in choosing word labels in the native language, there can be 
no question as to the meaning of nonverbal messages if that 
meaning is confined to the observable context. And since all 
speakers of English follow the same semantic path toward 
denotative understanding of their language, there should be 
no reason not to translate the child’s nonverbal messages 
into verbal ones.
Summary
Language and communication studies have been traced 
since the early "baby biographies" (Ingram, 1989) to Chomsky 
(1957). Important aspects of development as presented by 
Knapp and Hall (1992) have been enumerated. Context, 
identified as an important factor in communication studies 
(Vorobey, 1989), has been explained in the theory of Ochs 
(1988) as negotiation of cultural knowledge acquired and 
organized through communication. White’s (1982) theory has 
been presented to explain the orgin of communication in 
nonverbal behavior from an ethological foundation.
Carroll’s (1986) study extends the theory of White to the 
development of the individual child and shows that children 
do express nonverbal statements that have verbal meaning.
The child him/herself translates nonverbal statements into 
verbal sentences as s/he matures and develops speech.
Similarities in anthropoid and human language shown by 
Vygotsky (1962) have been identified as possibly identical 
by Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) by comparing the use of the 
cultural contex of the human child with chimpanzees. Hirsh- 
Pasek and Golinkoff (1991) demonstrate the comprehension of 
verbal sentences in infants.
The foundation for Sign-sentence theory rests on these 
theories. Together, they propose that language and 
communication knowledge is inherited phylogentically (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1969; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991; Vygotsky, 1969;
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White, 1982); and that the human infant is born with an 
intuitive knowledge of language (Chomsky, 1957). Infant and 
ape studies reported by Knapp and Hall (1992) reinforce 
these propositions. The development of language is 
triggered by the language environment (Chomsky, 1957) and 
the expansion of language development is promoted by 
negotiation of the cultural contex (Ochs,1988) as 
demonstrated by Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) with young apes. 
Sentential knowledge, known as deep structures (Chomsky, 
1957), has been shown in the comprehension of sentences by 
infants previous to their production of such sentences 
(Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 1991). This comprehension of 
verbal sentences also demonstrates the infants’ 
understanding of behavioral displays corresponding to the 
matching verbalism. Carroll’s (1986) work specifies how the 
nonverbal communication of young children develops into 
verbal language through the performance of communication. 
These are the bases for Sign-sentence theory which translate 
the child’s sentential knowledge of behavioral displays used 
for communication purposes into the sentences which the 
child is not yet ready to perform verbally but is committed 
to in future verbal performance.
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METHOD AND PROCEDURE
Nonverbal communication in children is explored in 
three studies using qualitative methods. One is an 
observational study of the behavior of preschool children to 
exemplify the claims of White (1982) and Carroll (1986) and 
to identify formats according to structural theorists such 
as Birdwhistell (1970), Bruner (1983), Kendon (1972), 
McDermott, Gospodinoff, and Aaron (1981), Savage-Rumbaugh 
(1991), Scheflen (1968), and Wittgenstein (cited in 
Hartnack, 1986). The episodes were chosen for their 
completeness and their clarity for the reader. White's 
descriptions of the characteristics of children as they 
develop through communication phases is observed and 
recorded. The behavior is also analyzed according to 
Carroll's theory of congruence in communicative nonverbal 
behavior, and pertinent aspects of formats are pointed out 
according to the specified theorists.
Two studies display Sign-sentence theory translations. 
One is a nonverbal dance reported by McDermott et al. (1981) 
to show the verbal meanings of the nonverbal movements. The 
last study is the application of sign-sentences to a study 
by Braunwald (1983). This analysis shows how translating 
nonverbal behavior to sign-sentences may change the 
perspective of a communication study between an adult and a 
child.
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Study 1 
Preschool Laboratory Study
Behavioral Observations
Carroll’s (1986) theory of congruence in effective 
communication and the communication phases of White’s (1982) 
theory are applied to behavior in observations of preschool 
children two to five years old in an Oklahoma University 
laboratory program. Observation times of one and one-half 
hours to three hours per day, two or three days each week, 
were divided between morning classroom sessions and 
afternoon playground sessions. These observations covered a 
period of two months. Following is a sample of ten episodes 
which take place in the classroom and on the playground. 
Observation categories
Each child in interaction with others is observed for 
outstanding signals according to White’s communication 
phases: (Category A). The phases included are:
Phase II: two years old
These children are eager to follow the teacher’s 
direction with little interaction or assistance until there 
is an interruption of crisis. In crisis, they make their 
demands for assistance. Teacher and student mutually 
negotiate to solve problems. These younger children 
generally work closer to the teacher.
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Phase III: three to four years old
More independence and determination are exhibited in 
the behaviors of these children. Aggressive tendencies may 
result in an excessive amount of conflict. Teachers who do 
not have the nonverbal lessons well planned and programmed 
may find much frustration in the midst of several of these 
children.
Phase IV: four to five years old
These children are communicating their accomplishments 
and needs more smoothly and adequatly. Especially if these 
students have a rich background of experience and training, 
they are a joy for the teacher. With their communication 
accomplishments, the renegotiation phase proceeds easily.
In the second category, each interaction is observed 
for congruence according to Carroll’s division of "known 
information" and "new information": (Category B). Other
informative observations are in a third category: (Category
C) .
Formats are analyzed in the final category: (Category
D> . A review of some structural requirements of formats may 
be helpful at this point. The first theorists, McDermott et 
al. (1981) explain identification of formats:
In addition to naming, a context can be formulated 
by a statement of what is required of a member in a 
particular context. For example, the structure of a
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classroom reading lesson can be formulated by the 
teacher calling on a child to read or by a child 
complaining that he never gets a t u r n . O n  occasion, 
a gesture can stand on its own as the sole signal for 
a prolonged context. The condition for the 
description of any signal as a feature of the work 
members do to contextualize each other is that it is 
responded to; that is, upon signaling the members act 
as if the signaled context was in fact the reality at 
hand, be it accepted or challenged, (p.378-379) (see 
Footnote 3)
Aspects identified by the second theorist Birdwhistell 
(1970) as reported by Kendon (1972) state that:
Birdwhistell...is interested in the order or pattern 
that can be observed in the ways in which people relate 
their behavior to one another when they are in each 
other’s presence. For Birdwhistell, communication is 
to be viewed as a system with a structure...By this 
systemic view of communication, anything that anyone 
does in the presence of another must be considered as 
potentially part of the system. Speech and gesture, 
posture and orientation, touch and relative position 
in space— all must be taken into account. (p.442) (see 
Footnote 4)
Birdwhistell also believes that full meaning of behavioral 
display must include the usage of that display. In
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explaining this requirement of Birdwhistell (1970), Kendon 
(1972) explains:
For him, to ask what a given unit of body motion 
"means" is to ask what its "use" is. Questions such 
as, Vhat does it mean whan a person smiles? or Vhat 
does it mean when a person raises his fist and shakes 
it back and forth? can only be answered by giving a 
list of the environments in which these forms are 
generally seen. In other words, we can answer these 
questions in terms of the range of use. (p.446)
(see Footnote 4)
The third theorist, Bruner (1983). describes a format:
A format formally entails a contingent interaction 
between at least two acting parties, contingent in 
the sense that the response of "each" member can be 
shown to be dependent upon a prior response of the 
"other." Each member of the minimal pair has a goal 
and a set of means for its attainment...It is the 
goal-directed aspect of formats that makes the 
signalling of intention (and the signalling of 
uptake) so simple. This is greatly aided 
by the fact that early formats are so overt, as in 
games like hide-and seek, give-and take, peek-a-boo, 
and where's the X?...Infants learn early to signal 
intended action formats and to expect uptake, (p.36-37) 
(see Footnote 7)
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The definition of routine is given by the theorist Savage 
Rumbaugh (1991):
Routines are defined as a "more or less regularly 
sequenced set of interindividual interactions that occur in 
a relatively similar manner across time, or at different 
times” (p.215). Some examples of routines would be changing 
diapers, getting ready to go outdoors, taking a bath, riding 
in the car, packing a backpack, blowing bubbles, etc. The 
chimpanzee may be a willing or unwilling participant or 
observer. When the young ape is learning a routine, the 
routine is inevitably accompanied by gestural, lexical, or 
vocal markers by the caretakers to convey the intended 
action to the ape. However, Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) states: 
Once the routine is understood, it will be initiated 
by the ape. At first, such initiations will be rather 
primitive in the sense that they will be action based 
and context dependent. For example, the chimpanzee 
may see the bottle of bubbles among other toys and 
pick it up and look at the caretaker. By selecting 
the bubbles from among other things, the chimpanzee 
thus has conveyed its desire to execute the "bubble- 
blowing" routine. Later, it may simply point to the 
bubbles and look at the caretaker. Still later, it 
will point to the BUBBLES lexigram and turn to the 
caretaker, (p.217) (see Footnote 9)
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Savage-Rumbaugh also provides details for the interaction 
between the caretaker and the young ape concerning the 
learning of routines in the example of the "going outdoors 
routine” :
As this routine is initiated, the chimpanzee may be 
asked to retrieve a shirt to wear outdoors. After 
this routine is well established and the components 
are behaviorally anticipated by the chimp, the routine 
will be initiated only by symbolic markers (or words). 
If the chimpanzee does not link these vocal markers to 
the next expected component of the "going outdoors 
routine,” it will not respond. The caretaker then will 
produce more elaborate and direct action-based markers, 
such as looking toward the shirts, putting a shirt in 
the chimp’s hand, and if necessary, returning to the 
original action of the routine, that of putting the 
shirt on the chimp. (219) (see Footnote 9)
Formats, identified as ”language-games" by Wittgenstein 
(cited in Hartnack, 1986) must include understanding of 
usage in addition to vocabulary or merely naming. This has 
been described previously in his discussion of the workman’s 
use of the word "hammer" without any explanation for its 
use. This usage structures the meaning of communication.
This structure of meaning is seen by Scheflen (1968) as 
patterns within patterns which comprise a "program" of 
communication with implicit instructions. Although Scheflen
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may see patterns as overlapping components of different 
routines or formats, we can also see this idea of patterns 
within patterns as formats within formats when applied to 
preschool children. Ve can see a hierarchical arrangement 
of formats for each individual child. For instance, an 
overriding format would be the one of the parents’ taking 
the child to school each day. This might be called the 
"going to school" format, or, from the child’s point of 
view, "Each day, I go where my parents take me." Once at 
school, a second level of formats would be entered into with 
the rest of the children and the teachers. This format 
would be, "Working in the classroom." or "I work with the 
exercises in the area where my teacher directs." This 
brings us to the final level of the individual child working 
with individual exercises and other children. It is at this 
level we find the episodes of the observation study. In the 
evaluation of each episode, the condition required in the 
theory of McDermott et al. (1981) is noted. That is, that 
the intiating signal for contextualization must be responded 
to by another, either accepted or challenged, to establish 
the format. Each interaction is identified as being part of 
a format, and the format is named. Other aspects of the 
formats are identified in the evaluation according to the 
other theorists.
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Episode I.
Cleaning-up time is taking place in the classroom. 
Children are putting their things away.
The teacher is walking behind a child with her 
hands on the child's shoulders. She is "walking 
him" to the shelf where puzzles are kept. The 
child is holding a puzzle with his two hands in 
front of him.
Analysis: A. Phase III
B. Known information - The child has a puzzle.
New information -The child won’t replace it.
C. The teacher is in control.
The teacher is forceful.
The teacher is sending information to the
child.
D. Format - Putting work away.
Initiating signal The teacher's placement
of the puzzle in 
the hands of the boy 
and direction by the 
hands of the teacher 
on the boy’s shoulders
Evaluation:
Evaluation: A. Phase III is the phase of conflict
between child and adult. In this case, the teacher’s 
forceful nonverbal communication indicates that the child 
cannot or will not obey the rule of putting puzzles away.
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Putting work away when finished is one of the basic rules of 
the classroom, and all the students must learn to obey.
B. Since the children have been told verbally to put 
their things away (as they are told each time by the 
teachers), and the child does not comply, the teacher 
communicates to him nonverbally to clearly
direct the message to him in a way that he can understand. 
Just as a 10-12 month old might tug at a parent’s leg to 
direct attention, the teacher directs his movements with the 
puzzle.
C. It is the teacher’s role to enforce the rules of 
the classroom. Putting things away is part of the social 
order that must be taught.
D. From the systemic view of Birdwhistell (1970) 
reported by Kendon (1972), gesture, posture and orientation, 
touch and relative position in space must all be taken into 
account. The goal of the behavioral display of the teacher 
is the movement of the puzzle back to the shelf. This is 
pursued through the teacher's touch, orientation, and 
relative position in space to the pupil. From 
Wittgenstein’s (cited in Hartnack, 1986) theory, we can see 
that the student’s knowledge of the puzzle alone, or his 
appreciation of the puzzle, is not enough in this format.
To understand the meaning of using puzzles in the classroom, 
its replacement to the shelf must be included. The teacher 
is holding the student accountable for this. As Bruner
10!
(1983) would suggest, her signal is simple, and she expects 
uptake. The boy walks compliantly as the teacher's hands 
direct him. Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) would, no doubt, 
identify this as a routine that is not yet "agreed upon"
The teacher found it necessary to produce "more elaborate 
and direct action-based markers" to hold the child 
accountable to the goals of the format.
Episode 11.
Children are seated at the snack table. One 
child, Lindsey, serves snack to each child. She 
stops when one boy does not say, "Thank you.”
She tells him to say, "Thank you.” The boy is 
silent. He shakes his head from side to side. 
The teacher tells her to go on serving. Lindsey 
looks puzzled, but continues.
Analysis: A. Girl - Phase IV
Boy Phase III
B. Known information - People say "Thank you"
when you give them 
something.
New information - l.This boy doesn’t
have to say it.
2.Vhat teacher says is 
more important than 
saying, "Thank you."
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C. Teacher deals with conflict
D. Format - Serving and Receiving Snack 
Initiating signal - Lindsey’s request for
a verbal response, 
"Thank you."
Evaluation: A. The girl, Lindsey, is evidently in
White’s "easier to live with" phase, capable of doing 
helpful chores and keeping rules. The boy, on the other 
hand, is still in the phase of conflict.
B. Lindsey signifies that she knows each person should 
say, "Thank you" by asking the boy to repeat the phrase. 
Everyone else at the table also says, "Thank you." However, 
the teacher’s judgment in this case is the overriding rule. 
The boy does not say it. For Lindsey, to do "what the 
teacher says" is the stronger rule since she continues to 
serve.
C. The teacher chooses to ignore the boy’s refusal 
rather than to increase the conflict between him and Lindsey 
by insisting that he say, "Thank you."
D. With Lindsey’s request of the boy to say, "Thank 
you, ’’ she holds the student accountable for that part of the 
format. His challenge by shaking his head back and forth 
responds to her request. In this format, saying "Thank you 
is included in the meaning of receiving snack in the 
classroom, as Wittgenstein (cited in Hartnack, 1986) would 
direct. Lindsey’s puzzled facial response to the negative
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head movement of the boy reveals that she does not 
understand the teacher’s acceptance of the boy’s response, 
but since ’’minding the teacher” is an overriding format, she 
leaves the boy’s accountability for his actions to the 
teacher. This may be another case of an unlearned routine 
according to Savage-Rumbaugh (1991). The structure of this 
interaction is dependent upon the nonverbal head movement 
and facial expression of the interactants as Kendon’s (1972) 
report of Birdwhistell (1970) would propose. The rest of 
the children complied with their responsibility to the 
format of snack time upon Lindsey’s initiating signal that 
she was ready to serve (standing by the tray of snack and 
waiting for children to be seated). They showed their 
accountability by sitting together side-by side at the 
table, and each, in turn as s/he was served, by saying 
"Thank you.” The simple initiating signal and uptake of 
Brunner can be seen in this group’s snack time and also in 
the interaction where the format is challenged (Lindsey’s 
request and the boy’s shaking his head back and forth).
Episode III.
Nate and the teacher are at the snack table. 
Nate picks up the pitcher and starts to drink 
from it. Teacher puts her fingers on top of 
the pitcher and hands him a cup.
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Analysis: A. Phase III
B. Known information - Nate wants a drink.
New information- Nate can't drink from
a pitcher; he must use 
a cup.
C. The teacher protects the group of children 
from contagious germs by communicating that 
one must use an individual cup for 
drinking.
D. Format - Getting a drink by myself 
Initiating signal - The teacher’s placement
of her hand on top 
of the pitcher
Evaluation: A. Phase III, the phase where the young
"feel free to stray" is evident in Nate’s ignoring the cups 
which everyone else always uses for drinking.
B. It is evident that Nate wants a drink. The teacher 
communicates the improper and proper manner of drinking by 
placing her fingers over the top of the pitcher and handing 
Nate a cup.
C. It is the teacher’s responsibility not only to 
teach the social rule for getting a drink, but also the 
dangers of drinking from a community pitcher. It is her 
duty to enforce such health rules.
D. The teacher is holding Nate accountable to the 
format of the drinking water exercise by placing her hand on
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top of the pitcher. Nate accepts her challenging direction 
by taking the cup she hands him and using it appropriately. 
The signals of initiation and uptake are simple (Bruner, 
1983) and may be another case of an unlearned routine 
(Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991). Wittgenstein’s (cited in Hartnack, 
1986) usage of pitcher and cups in this format is evident.
Episode IV.
I look at a boy who is yelling and pulling on a 
toy held by another child. He stops yelling, 
but continues pulling on the toy.
Analysis: A. Phase III
B. Known information - The boy, giving a
shrieking yell, wants 
the toy.
New information - The boy, quiet, still
wants the toy.
C. The teacher is not looking.
D. Format - Working in the classroom. 
Initiating signal: Placing a holding
grasp on the toy
Evaluation: A. The boy is screaming and in conflict with
another child, in the conflict phase
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B. By looking at the boy as he yells, I evidently 
show my discomfort which signals him to stop yelling. 
However, he continues to pull with all his might, his face 
strained in effort, but not making a sound. To analyze my 
facial expression, we could say:
B. Known information - You are yelling.
New information - You are giving
me discomfort.
C. The boy might be yelling to get the teacher’s help, 
but she is occupied elsewhere.
D. Working in the classroom includes taking turns with 
the toys obtained from the shelf. Reaching out for a toy 
held by another child is not an option in this format. 
Holding onto the toy was the initiating signal of the first 
child to hold the second accountable for his actions. The 
second child’s attempt to take a toy not on the shelf shows 
the lack of understanding of the format of working in the 
classroom (Wittgenstein cited in Hartnack, 1986). The 
meaning found in knowing how the toys are to be used is also 
found in the theory of Birdwhistell (1970} reported by 
Kendon {19721). Also, this theory’s proposal that the 
structure of communication in interaction is constructed 
through behavioral display is shown here. The second child, 
not having learned the proper format (Savage-Rumbaugh,
1991), was evidently initiating a simple format of ” I want a
Ill
toy,*’ and since the teacher was not there to hold the second 
child accountable, it was up to the first child to challenge 
him. Scheflen (1968) might propose that the instructions 
for this program for the first child include, "If someone 
tries to take your work, yell and hold on tight; don’t let 
go,” and if someone doesn’t like your yelling, quit yelling, 
but hold on anyway. ’’
Episode V .
Two children, a girl and a boy, tug back and forth 
holding the same bead rack. They keep tugging 
until they fall over on the floor. The teacher 
notices them. "Oh what happened?" She leans over 
to them, helping them up. "You play with this 
together." The girl, walking away, leaves the 
bead rack to the boy.
Analysis: A. Phase III
B. Known information Two children want the
same toy.
New information - Two children must
work together (or one 
must leave.)
C. The teacher deals with conflict.
D. Format - Working in the classroom 
Initiating signal - "Oh what happened?"
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Evaluation: A. The conflict phase is evident.
B. The children communicate to each other and to the 
teacher that each one wants the bead rack. The teacher 
communicates verbally that the two of them should work 
together, but she does not demonstrate nonverbally how to do 
this. The children are not able to follow the teacher’s 
direction.
C. The teacher, who is occupied with other children 
also either does not have the time, or does not know how to 
direct the children to work together.
D. Before the teacher’s intervention, the boy had been 
trying to challenge the girl’s choice of the same bead rack 
he worked with. However, this bead rack was an exercise 
that could be shared and worked with by more than one 
person. The teacher holds them both accountable by her 
intervention. The girl knows that the teacher’s direction 
must be followed or she must find something else to do. She 
evidently does not want to share the exercise or does not 
know how, so she chooses the latter. The instruction for 
the program (If you will not share, then find something else 
for yourself.) is upheld (Scheflen, 1968), and the girl 
accepts her responsiblity in the format by choosing other 
work. Wittgenstein’s (cited in Hartnack, 1986) concept that 
the two interactants must share knowledge of usage is shown 
here (that the exercise in question may be used by two 
persons).
J. J .O
Episode VI
Analysis:
A new student has just finished her first day 
at school. She is leaving with her father.
He points back into the classroom as they 
approach the door to leave. The teacher is 
watching from the middle of the classroom.
The child turns around, smiles, and waves 
to the teacher.
A. Phase IV
B. Known information -It is time to leave
the teacher.
New information - Tell her, "good bye.”
C. The teacher waves back. It appears that 
it has been a good first day at school.
D. Format - Going home time 
Initiating signal- Father’s pointing
gesture
Evaluation: A. The child seems to exhibit the
confidence of this phase.
B. The father nonverbally communicates his direction 
to the child to wave to her teacher. She complies.
C. The nonverbal parting is a positive one between 
the student and the teacher.
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D. The simple intiation and uptake (Bruner, 1983) are 
shown in the Father’s directing the child’s gaze back to the 
teacher and the child’s wave. Telling the teacher, ’’Good­
bye.” is part of the format of going home. The child 
acknowledges her understanding of this format by waving, not 
merely looking in the direction of the gesture at the 
teacher (Wittgenstein cited in Hartnack, 1986). The format 
is initiated and identified by the father and accepted in 
the response of the child. Their actions construct this 
system for communication (Kendon’s (1972} discussion of 
Birdwhistell (1970>).
Episode VII.
An Asian child, who has been cutting paper, 
holds out her hands, palms up, one holding the 
other. ’’Did you cut your finger?” the teacher 
asks. The little girl nods, ”yes.” Let 
me see.” The teacher looks. "You just pinched 
it.”
Analysis: A. Phase II
B. Known information - The child has been
using scissors.
New information - The child has hurt
her finger
C. The teacher helps.
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D. Format - I hurt myself
Initiating signal - Child's holding up
her hands, one cupped 
in the other
Evaluation: A. The phase in this episode does not seem to
be clearly identified. The mutual negotiation seems to 
indicate Phase II.
B. The child communicates nonverbally to the teacher 
that she has hurt her finger.
C. The teacher and the child work together mutually to 
solve the little girl’s problem.
D. The child who has been involved in the papei—  
cutting format has pinched her finger with the scissors. The 
adult’s reassurance is part of every child’s format when 
hurt. The child initiates the interaction by holding up the 
hurt hand held by the other hand for the teacher to see.
The teacher accepts responsibility with reassurance. These 
actions are simple (Bruner, 1983> and well understood 
(Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991). The interaction constructs the 
communication as Birdwhistell (1970) would propose according 
to the description of Birdwhistell ’ s theory by Kendon 
(1972)). The teacher responds appropriately with 
reassurance. She understands that in this format, it is 
required that a statement of reassurance be given (’’You just 
pinched it”), not merely acknowledgement or acceptance 
(Wittgenstein cited in Hartnack, 1986).
116
Episode VIII.
Debbie is saying, "Uh, oh. Uh, oh. Uh, oh.!’’ 
The teacher asks her what the matter is. ”What 
are you trying to tell me, Deb.” Debbie points 
to the broken crayons and crumbs on the table, 
left from pounding the crayons on the table 
instead of coloring with them. The teacher 
says, ’’That’s o.k.”
Analysis: A. Phase II
B. Known information -Children have been
pounding with crayons.
New information - The crayons are broken.
C. The teacher helps end the crisis.
D. Format - Our crayons are hurt.
Initiating signal -”Uh, oh. Uh,oh.”
Evaluation: 
Phase 11.
A. The mutual negotiation seems to indicate
B. The child communicates nonverbally to the 
teacher what has happened to the crayons. The teacher 
responds verbally.
C. The teacher reassures the child that 
everything is o.k. Debbie has seemed upset by the incident.
D. Just as when a child is hurt, s/he needs 
and expects reassurance, so when part of the environment is 
disrupted, the child also needs reassurance. Since the
crayons have been broken, order has been broken, and Debbie 
initiates the vocal signal to which the teacher responds. 
Just as in the previous episode, the teacher accepts the 
expectation of Debbie who holds the teacher accountable for 
the goal of this format.
Episode IX.
Analysis:
C.
D.
The children are outside gathered around a 
table set up with equipment for making soap 
bubbles. A little girl holds a bubble loop 
full of soap very still as she looks at the 
teacher. The teacher says, "O.K., I’m 
watching." The girl lets the bubble go by 
waving the loop through the air.
A. Phase IV
B. Known information - The girl has a bubble. 
Kew information - The teacher sees the
bubble.
The teacher approves of the girl’s action. 
The teacher is smiling and watching.
Format - Soap Bubbles
Initiating signal - Looking at teacher
Evaluation: A. The teacher is not directing, only
watching, allowing the child to direct her own activity. 
The child wants the teacher to see her activity and waits
lis
for the teacher. There is a mutual cooperation of teacher 
and student involved. This is indicative of the fourth 
phase. Of the fourth phase, White (1982) writes: "This phase 
has to be postulated for primates (mother<=========>young,
renegotiated). This phase is characterized by the growth of 
independence (or some modicum thereof) by the child. It 
involves continual adjustment on the part of the parents as 
the child grows,and on the part of the child as it becomes 
aware of the world around it" ( p.24). (see Footnote 21)
B. The child communicates to the teacher that she 
wants the teacher to watch, that she is waiting (standing 
very still and ready to release the bubble). The child does 
this with her body posture and her direction of gaze toward 
the teacher. The teacher seeing this, understands, which is 
evident from her verbal reply, "O.K., I"m watching."
C. The teacher and the child are evidently pleased 
with one another's performance. They are both laughing and 
seem to be having fun following the release of the bubble 
which they both watch float through the air.
D. The teacher has set up the "Soap Bubbles" exercise 
for several children who take or wait for their turns with 
the bubble loop. Since the children know the format, they 
may expect the teacher to see and evaluate their 
performance. The girl shows this expectation by looking in 
the direction of the teacher and waiting in a state of 
readiness until the teacher looks at her. In this way, the
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girl holds the teacher accountable for her role in the 
format, and the teacher accepts responsibility with her 
verbal reply. The signals are simple (Bruner, 1982) and 
well understood (Savage—Rumbaugh, 1991). Even though the 
relative position in space is from a distance, an important 
consideration of Birdwhistell (1970) reported by Kendon 
(1972), the nonverbal statement of the girl watching the 
teacher and standing in readiness with bubble loop held high 
is very clear.(i.e. I’m waiting on you, teacher, for your 
notice and approval.)
Episode X
Mary has been watching Justin who yelled, "Vatch 
this!” then took off on his scooter in a circular 
direction around the designated play area.
After having heard the teacher praise Justin for 
his skill in guiding the scooter in a "perfect 
circle,” Mary takes another scooter and performs 
the same skill, adding an additional difficulty 
of placing one foot upon the handle bars while 
very slowly coming to a stop. ”Your balance has 
improved so much since school started,” praises 
the teacher to Mary.
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Analysis: A. Phase IV
B. Known information -A boy rides skillfully;
the teacher praises.
New information - A girl rides just as
skillfully if not 
more so.
C. The teacher gives equal praise.
The teacher is cheerful.
D. Format-Riding Scooters
Initiating signal - Justin takes a scooter
Evaluation: A. The mutual cooperation of adult and child
is evident indicating the fourth phase.
B. Perhaps the girl really wants the same 
praise as Justin received, or perhaps she wants to ride a 
scooter better than Justin, but such interpretations are 
merely speculative. Vhat is evident is that Justin wanted 
to be watched (’’Watch this!” ). The teacher and Mary both 
watched him. The teacher praised him. Mary’s nonverbal 
response of riding her own scooter fits Carroll’s (1986) 
rule of congruence.
Most utterances (verbal and nonverbal) can be 
divided into given information that the 
receiver already knows and new information 
that is being conveyed by the sender.
Formulating messages that are congruent
21
with the given information of listeners 
is part of learning to communicate 
e f f e c t i v e l y , ( p .  315)
D. Experienced students have learned that teachers 
praise good work. Justin appears to have this knowledge as 
he calls for the teacher to watch his scooter ride. Mary, 
seems to concur as she repeats the display of scooter—  
riding. Their nonverbal displays which seem to say,"I’m 
riding a scooter very well,” hold the teacher accountable 
for responding with praise. The teacher accepts the format 
with her response. The teacher accepts the responsibility by 
praising each student individually in turn, understanding 
that her response is used for evaluation and praise in this 
format, paralleling Wittgenstein's (cited in Hartnack, 1986) 
requirement for usage and echoed by Birdwhistell (1970) as 
reported by Kendon (1972).
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Results of Observation Study 
Carroll’s (1986) study:
These episodes show that children’s activities in 
interaction can be identified as communication according to 
Carroll’s (1986) divisions of information in his theory of 
congruence.
Children’s behavior portrays White’s (1982) phases of 
communication.
Phase 11 : two years old
These children demonstrate the mutual initiation phase. 
Phase III: three to four years old
The child is shown to be the initiator in this phase. 
Conflict may result from determination and aggression.
Phase IV: four to five years old
The renegotiation phase is shown in this phase during 
the growth of independence and accomplishment.
Formats are identified:
Each episode has been identified as part of a format 
for communication. The format has been named; the 
initiating signal of one interactant and the response of the 
other have been designated according to the theory of 
McDermott et al. (1981) as explained in their description of 
a nonverbal dance in a children’s reading group. Other 
aspects of the formats have been identified according to the 
other structural theories reviewed.
Discussion
That nonverbal communication is abundant in early 
childhood has been shown here in the laboratory study. This 
nonverbal communication has been shown to exhibit congruence 
and a relative connection to the communicational maturation 
of the child.
White (1982) has proposed that human beings have 
phylogenetically developed verbal speech from nonverbal 
communication. Carroll (1986) has shown how this may happen 
ontogenetically in the speech development of the child.
In these episodes, each shown to be part of a 
communication format, can be seen, as discussed in the 
preview of "Observation categories,” a level of formats 
within a hierarchy of formats learned by the child. There 
is also a further aspect of formats within formats which 
must be pointed out. Within some episodes, more than one 
format may be seen. For instance, in Episode III, the 
initiating action for the "Getting a drink" format would be 
the teacher’s having set up the exercise so that each child 
could get a drink by her/himself, and having demonstrated 
the exercise to the children. As each child takes a cup to 
pour a drink of water, s/he is contextualizing and 
confirming this agreed-upon format. But the initiating 
action for the contextualizing repair work of interruption 
or misbehavior, or holding another accountable to the 
original format, would be the placement of the teacher's
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hand over the pitcher. This same dimension in the ’’Paper 
cutting” format, Episode VII, (where the teacher initiates 
the format by setting up the exercise for cutting paper and 
demonstrating it) includes an additional format or a 
subformat, ” I hurt myself.” The resolution of this latter 
format calls the child back to the original format of paper 
cutting. This same process can be seen in all the episodes 
in formats where rules of the format are broken or changed.
From this intermesh of formats, it appears that if the 
history of formats is known, it may be that the 
contextualizing repair work ( e.g., that described by 
McDermott et al. {1981} in the nonverbal dance in the 
children’s reading group) is actually interaction learned 
and transferred from previous formats, now embedded within a 
new format. A format, ’’Teachers praise.” can be seen in 
Episodes IX and X in this same way although rules are not 
broken, the students add to their performance their own 
various creative techniques, probably not included in the 
regular format, but requiring an additional response from 
the teacher. Mary is very creative in adding a new 
difficulty to her scooter ride. In Episode IX, where the 
teacher is actually supervising the activity from a 
distance, the girl calls upon the teacher to uphold the 
teacher’s responsible role in that format as supervisor, and 
the teacher’s praise, not simply acknowledgment, seems to be 
part of that role.
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In Episode X, Justin, who is acting independently and 
could have chosen to ride the scooter without comment to or 
from a teacher, chooses to initiate a format by eliciting a 
response from the teacher. His pleasant, mildly aggressive 
manner and his exclaiming vocal tone express an attitude of 
self-confidence which points to an expectation of 
affirmation by the teacher, not only by her watchful 
acknowledgment, but also by her praise.
In all of the supervised activities of students with 
their teachers, the role of the teacher in the format seems 
to be charactrized by the teacher’s attention and 
evaluation. The working consensus of the participants is 
that they are involved in a learning experience together. 
When this experience is changed from its regular routine, it 
usually happens from unexpected interruption, misbehavior, 
or creative supplementation, additional requirements added 
by individual interactants. At this time, contextualizing 
repair work may be needed to call the group back to the 
original format. This seems to point to the term "working 
consensus” as explained by McDermott et al. (1981) in 
discussing Coffman’s (1959) use of the term.
The term "working consensus” was originally used by 
Coffman (1959: 9-10) to refer to a ’’kind of interactional 
modus vivendi. Together the participants contribute to 
a single overall definition of the situation which 
involves not so much a real agreement as to what
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exists but rather a real agreement as to whose claims 
concerning what issues will be temporarily honored."
McDermott et al. (1981) explain their use of the term:
The term has been used by Kendon (1976:322) in much the 
same way we have been using it: "A central
problem in the investigation of interaction...will 
be to see how, in terms of the functioning of 
observable behavior, the "working consensus” for 
a given behavioral system is established and 
maintained. In particular, this means that we must 
identify those aspects of behavioral function which 
serve to control or regulate the behavior of the 
participants in relation to the currently established 
pattern of relationship. This requires that we look 
for regularities in behavioral relationship, but that 
we look closely at places where these regularities 
change." (p.396-97) (see Footnote 3)
There seem to be three ways the regularities in the 
behavioral relationship in the format may change; these are 
through interruption, through misbehavior (rule-breaking), 
and through creative supplementation. This is the point at 
which an embedded or second format may be found. In both 
formats, the contextualizing work of the participants may be 
seen to form the working consensus as described above by 
McDermott et al. (1981) and illustrated in the observations 
of the laboratory episodes previously described.
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study 2
Application of Slgn-sentences to a nonverbal dance
By applying verbal translations to nonverbal acts, 
coherence should remain the same or increase in clarity.
Let us look at an example of such an application to 
McDermott, Gospodinoff, and Aron’s (1981) description of a 
nonverbal dance in a children’s reading group (Frazier,
1992).
The study of McDermott. Gospodinoff. and Aron (1981)
McDermott et al. (1981) describe four positioning 
units for a reading group of six children and their teacher. 
Positioning I - the reading position 
Positioning II - getting organized for a turn
to read
Positioning III - behaving anarchically 
Positioning IV - waiting for teacher 
In their study, McDermott et al. (1981) examine the 
positioning of the children and find that every movement is 
orderly in forming the positioning and the context of what 
they are doing. Vhat appears to be chaotic behavior between 
reading turns is shown to be regularly sequenced with 
predictable consequences (see Illustrations, Appendix A).
The first unit constitutes a reading position, marked 
by each person’s looking at his or her book. The teacher 
calls on Maria to read, and soon everyone is looking in 
different directions. This is because Rosa calls for a
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turn, and the teacher tells her to wait. Again the teacher 
calls on Maria to read, but before she can begin, the 
teacher leans out of the group to speak to Audry sitting on 
the floor. Two children, Anna and Ted, also look toward 
Audry. Soon Perry and Rosa are also looking away from the 
group. Maria has the turn to read, but has no audience.
At this point, an incredibly precise dance takes place. 
The dance is made up of five movement clusters involving the 
members of the group. This is what happens:
First Cluster: The teacher begins to return her gaze to
Maria. Maria stops reading. Anna and 
Maria move their books down to the table. 
The teacher orients to them by jerking 
her head back and up.
Second Cluster: Rosa and Maria move their bodies down to
the table. Perry is looking away from . 
the group. The teacher looks at Perry. 
Perry looks toward the teacher with eyes 
gazing downard.
Rosa and Maria stop their movement. Rosa 
starts to move back, and the teacher 
starts to move her head away from Perry 
to her right. Perry begins to slump.
Maria and the teacher begin to look at 
each other. Rosa moves to her right, 
down and away from the teacher. Perry
Third Cluster:
Fourth Cluster:
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begins to further slump.
Fifth Cluster: Ted starts to reorganize his posture for
reading. The teacher moves her head 
toward Maria, and Maria looks intently at 
the teacher. The teacher says, ”A little 
louder please,” as if the problem with 
the group was that Maria had not been 
reading loudly enough.
McDermott et al. point out that the group was committed
to Positioning I, the reading position. They show that the
order is formulated, oriented to, and used by the members to
hold each other accountable. In this example, the teacher
had called on a child to read. Although attention seemed to
spread around the room, in this case the members of the
group keep a careful watch on each other, and are sensitive 
to the movements of each other. During a waiting 
positioning (IV), Maria could put her book down, and no one 
would notice, or the teacher could turn to Perry, and he
would not attend. But in the reading positioning (I),
because the members understand what it is that they are 
doing with each other, the movements have different 
meanings, meanings to which they all respond. McDermott et 
al. call this contextualizing work to regenerate a 
particular social order.
McDermott et al. explain, "People achieve order in 
face-to-face behavior by formulating a working consensus of
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what they are doing with each other, by orienting to and 
holding each other accountable for the proper ordering of 
their behavior, and by doing it in such a way as to allow 
for the sequential proposal and possible confirmation of 
their consensuses” (p.396) . (see Footnote 3) The consensus 
of this group was that they were going to have a reading 
lesson together. They were going to take turns reading as 
the teacher gave each permission, and they were going to pay 
attention and listen to the reader. This was to be an 
experience that they agreed to share together. By looking 
at the clusters of the nonverbal dance, the meaning of this 
commitment to share this experience may be verified by 
attaching some verbal parallels:
First Cluster: Teacher - "I spoke to Audry, but I am
turning my attention back to you, 
now, Maria."
Maria - "I stop reading; noone is 
listening.”
Anna and Maria: "Ve put our books down.”
Teacher - ” I motion you to pick up your . 
books.”
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Second Cluster; Rosa and Maria - ”We shift positions; no one
is reading."
Teacher - ’’I’m looking at you, Perry. I see 
you looking away.”
Perry - ” I may look at you.” (eyes
downcast)
Third Cluster: Rosa and Maria - ”Ve sit back into position.” 
Teacher - ’’I’m looking in Ted’s direction.” 
Perry - ’’I’m settled.”
Fourth Cluster: Teacher - ’’Maria, I’m looking at you.”
Maria - 
Rosa - 
Perry -
Fifth Cluster: Ted -
Teacher- 
Maria -
I see you, teacher.”
I am getting in position.”
I am still ready.”
I’m getting ready.”
I see you, Maria.”
I am watching you, teacher.”
Results
By looking at these verbal parallels of the nonverbal 
messages in the nonverbal dance, it is evident that each 
member of the group was acting appropriately to do his or 
her part to carry out the task they had set for themselves. 
First one member and then another responded in reciprocal 
fashion as though attuned together. As they did this, they
reconfirmed their purpose— their commitment to the reading 
lesson together.
This example shows that adding verbal translations to 
the nonverbal communication lends clarity to understanding. 
And although in supplying these verbal parallels, we want to 
avoid excessive overcoding (i.e., Teacher - ’’I’m 
frustrated,” or Perry - "I’m bored.” ), we cannot deny that 
these verbal statements help bring the episode to life for 
the reader.
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Study 3
Sentence-sjj-ps of the Pre-linguistlc Child 
Let us look at a nonverbal study by Braunwald <1983) as 
it was originally reported, then add the effects of 
translating the sentence-signs. The scene for the example 
includes a prelinguistic child sitting on her father’s lap. 
The mother enters eating ice cream and sits next to them. 
Cheryl is 9 months old.
The Original Braunwald (1983) Study^^
Sequence of Communication
C. Cheryl sees ice cream
Child Partner
C. Cheryl leans toward 
her mother
C. Ehhh!
M. Mother gives Cheryl 
a taste of ice cream.
Notice/knowledge Perceives
of ice cream 
in dish.
Use of space 
to establish 
topic.
child's 
notice. 
Perceives 
shift in 
child’s 
focus.
Affect/intention Interprets 
Attention-getting intention
and
meaning. 
Acknowledges 
child’s 
request.
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Note the communication sequence in the first column.
The normal turn-taking pattern is not recorded as such. The 
mother’s turn is listed only once. In the other columns, 
nonverbal behaviors are interpreted for the child, and 
cognitive processes are described for the mothei— partner 
(with the exception of the last item which merely describes 
the final movement of the mother.)
Application of Sien-sentences
Cheryl - ” I see you eat ice cream."
Mother - "I see you watching me."
Cheryl - "I come to you. Mother."
Mother - "I’m watching you, Cheryl."
Cheryl - "Ehhh!"
Mother - "Have some ice cream, Cheryl."
Result
By revealing the sign-sentences, the communicative 
messages are revealed, and the accurate exchange of turns 
brings the whole transaction into its proper perspective. 
With this method, it can be seen that both partners share 
equal responsibility as communicators; whereas from the 
researcher’s point of view, the whole episode is seen as 
almost totally dependent upon her understanding alone.
135
Braunwald explains the episode in the report:
...the communicative outcome is almost 
entirely dependent upon the listener's ability 
to interpret the child’s intention on the 
basis of her knowledge of the situation. (p. 254) 
(see Footnote 26)
A more accurate description would point to the fact 
that the child sent messages to the mother who received them 
and responded appropiately.
Discussion
Some might object that the application of sign- 
sentences to the Braunwald study (1983) is "putting words 
into an infant's mouth" who cannot speak. However, language 
is merely a tool for expressing knowledge and ideas more 
efficiently. Although Cheryl may not speak, research shows 
that infants may acquire much knowledge (Hetherington & 
Parke, 1986; Ingram, 1989; Kagan, 1987: Neisser, 1976 
Vorobey, 1989). Judging from her behavior, sign-sentences 
may already be established in Cheryl's "receptive language." 
The fact that Cheryl's ideas are unspoken should not deprive 
her of validation as a communicator. Observers of this 
episode would surely agree that Cheryl knew what she saw and 
saw what she wanted. How did these facts become known? 
Cheryl communicated them.
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Braunwald’s subjective perspective of nonverbal 
communication seems to be a common one for most researchers 
as well as laypersons. The nonverbal sender may be denied 
as such, which leaves the message denied also by fully or 
partially ignoring it. It is almost as if the listener or 
observer were feining ignorance or unawareness. DeVito 
(1985) explains "feining” by pointing to the instance of 
the teacher who ignores the student looking out the window. 
Of course, feining unawareness may be acceptable or even 
necessary in everyday interaction, but in studies of 
nonverbal communication, research must demand the greatest 
objectivity possible.
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FINAL SUMMARY
White (1982) has supported her theory of the phylogentic 
inheritance of communication by identification of parallel 
phases of development in mammals including the human child. 
Her phases are corroborated in a general way by Gesell’s 
(1946) descriptions of the developmental periods of growth in 
human children. These growth stages are still used today by 
child development specialists, and the episodes observed in 
the laboratory study have provided examples of these phases 
in preschool children. White’s hypothesis that language 
develops from nonverbal communication has been demonstrated 
by Carroll (1986) with a synthesis of studies showing how 
nonverbal communication of the child develops into verbal 
communication (Clark & Clark, 1977; Greenfield & Smith, 1976; 
Scollon, 1976). Congruence of "Known information” and "New 
information" was analyzed in the laboratory study to explore 
the work of Carroll (1986).
More specific support for phylogentic inheritance of 
intentional communication ability in human children has been 
demonstrated by Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) in providing human 
cultural contextual formats with successful results in apes. 
The work of Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) not only supports White’s 
(1982) ethological view, but also reinforces the theory of 
Ochs (1986) that cultural knowledge and linguistic knowledge 
are not separate, but parts of the same acquisition process
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because it was in the cultural context of human routines such 
as "preparation of the bottle," "going outdoors,” "diaper 
changing," etc. that the apes developed their communicative 
and language abilities.
The work of Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) also appears to have 
dispelled the hypothesis of Chomsky (1957, 1980, 1983) that
the innateness of language is species-specific. Perhaps the 
upper level of development of language, the growth of 
language into more complicated transformational language is 
species-specific. But it certainly appears that the cultural 
contex is the triggering facilitator for language development 
and, since anthropoids will never live in the human culture 
as human children do, except in experimental conditions, the 
full range of their developmental abilities may never be 
known.
Even without the provision of the learning process of 
cultural routines, Knapps and Hall’s (1992) reports of the 
inborn sensitivity of newborns to language where babies 12 
hours old tended to demonstrate correspondence of body 
movements to the rhythms of human speech (Condon & Sander,
1974) and the imitative abilities in facial expressions 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983a, 1983b) support the theory of
predisposition for language and nonverbal communication.
Also Knapp and Hall’s acknowledgment of similarities in 
facial displays to primate relatives as shown by Pitcairn and
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Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1976) and cultural unlversals based on 
phylogenetic adaptations (Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1987) and their 
link with emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1969) are all in accord 
with the developmental perspectives of White (1982) and 
Savage-Rumbaugh (1991).
Deep structures, the innate essence of simple sentences, 
which are thought to be species-specific by Chomsky (1957, 
1980, 1983), appear to be phylogentically inherited. These
structures which provide comprehension and production 
abilities for language have been demonstrated in the 
Preferential Looking Paradigm by Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff 
(1991). Their goal was to investigate the understanding of 
simple sentences in infants. They showed that, indeed, 
infants do understand verbal messages in simple sentences.
And by so doing, they inadvertently also showed that infants 
do understand the nonverbal behavioral displays which 
correspond to those verbal sentential messages. Also, 
although they did not acknowledge it, they accepted the 
child’s ’’nonverbal communication” (looking at the proper 
television monitor to match the verbal message) as the 
’’correct answer.”
It follows, then, that the comprehension of the verbal 
sentence can be supplied by the child for the corresponding 
behavioral display which acts as a sign for the sentence, and 
the child may send messages nonverbally as signs which
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communicate. Translations for nonverbal behavior similar to 
the verbal sentences used by Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff (1991) 
have been provided by Frazier (1992) for the nonverbal dance 
of a children's reading group analyzed by McDermott et al 
(1981). Translations have also been provided for a 
nonverbal study by Braunwald (1983) for a prelinguistic 
child.
Although objections may be raised by linguistic 
followers of Chomsky (1957) who believe that language is 
species-specific and deny nonverbal communication as part of 
the language; and, in spite of objections of nonverbal 
researchers who advocate theories such as Wiener et al.
(1972) (Burgeon, 1985; Ekman & Friesen, 1969), and who base 
meaning of behavior on vocabulary alone, such translations 
are offered as a viable decoding and encoding device for 
nonverbal communication. The structural meaning of formats 
as advocated by Kendon (1972), Birdwhistell (1970), Scheflen 
(1968), McDermott et al. (1981), and Wittgenstein (cited in 
Hartnack, 1986) cannot be denied. Though they individually 
view structure from their different perspectives, they all 
attest to the fact that true meaning is in the structure of 
behavior rather than in merely a nominal process. That the 
structure of the format is dependent upon the structure of 
communication has been shown by McDermott et al. (1981), 
Savage-Rumbaugh (1991), and Bruner (1983) from their 
different perspectives. On the basis of this theoretical
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support, Sign-sentence theory proposes to provide a link 
which integrates verbal and nonverbal communication, a link 
which is vital to understanding human communication (Knapp et 
al., 1978), It is expected that sign-sentence translations 
can become the basis for further research in transformation 
of meaning of nonverbal communication.
Final Discussion 
Sign-sentence theory proposes to translate nonverbal 
behavioral display by using the corresponding simple sentence 
for the display as its coded meaning. It is limited to face- 
to-face interaction in the context of a format. It is also 
currently limited because it does not provide for 
transformation of sentences into more complicated ones. 
However, based on the transformational approach to the 
description of the language provided by Chomsky (1957), it 
appears that once the basic meaning of the behavior is coded 
as a simple sentence, further transformations of upper levels 
or surface meanings may be revealed through organized 
transformational rules. These rules should be defined 
according to the context and functions or goals of the 
context. The patterns producing transformations may be as 
complex as Scheflen’s (1968) configurations. Some directions 
for these organzational definitions may be ascertained from 
the various supporting theories already provided. A simple 
beginning point might be to look at the communication path 
for a child. In the beginning, there would be few
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restrictions from the environment placed on the communicative 
processes of the child, but soon cultural and other format 
restrictions would become part of the interaction. To get an 
idea of how the communication process would work from birth, 
we may identify beginning knowledge of the child, add 
cultural constraints, and other requirements of formats; for 
instance, the functions of nonverbal communication as 
identified by Burgoon (1985) might be included. The 
developmental path might proceed in this manner:
1. Every human child is born with innate sentential 
knowledge which is phylogentically inherited.
2. Every human child is born with innate comprehension 
ability of nonverbal behavior.
3. Shortly after birth, deep structural knowledge develops 
further through interpersonal interaction with others.
4. Sometime during the first year, comprehension of simple 
sentences can be said to exist.
5. Sensory reception (e.g., seeing an image of body movement 
(sentence-sign>> will produce in the receiver child the 
corresponding sentential meaning (sign-sentence), or the 
child will produce sentence-signs to portray meaning and 
initiate communication. .
5. Additional sentence-signs may be combined to produce 
additional sign-sentences.
7. Cultural knowledge will be noted as acceptable or 
unacceptable.
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8. Functions will be identified. Burgeon (1985) lists: 
"facilitation of cognitive processing and learning, 
expression of emotions and attitudes, impression formation 
and management, relational communication, deception, social 
influence, and the structuring and regulation of 
interaction.” (p.382)
9. Formats or routines and goals will be identified within 
the functional context (e.g.. The goal of a reading group is 
to have a reading lesson together).
10. An initiation or a response will be encoded or decoded in 
sentences and/or sentence-signs.
A flow chart for communication for a child might be similar 
to the one shown in Figure 1. The directional path for 
deriving surface structures from deep structures and their 
further transformations should be the same or similar for 
encoding and decoding. As the child matures, the nature of 
the system components or elements would change (e.g., less 
cultural knowledge or more cultural knowledge), and more 
organizational components would be added. For an adult, if 
using Burgoon’s functional elements, all might be included.
If research reveals the transformations made as the 
child matures, some will be, no doubt, obligatory and some 
optional. Some will be the same in all settings; others will 
be different in different settings. If these are developed 
according to the developmental stages in the child, it may be 
possible to see how the cultural knowledge develops along
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with linguistic knowledge. For instance, what cultural rules 
does the child first learn? How do these transform with later 
learning? As the child matures and the decoding-encoding 
system matures, what elements change? What stages introduce 
new functional elements? Is there a stage in life where some 
functional elements are deleted? On what does the rate of 
growth depend? How do the systems at the end of the life 
span compare with those at the beginning? How do 
interactants' systems change through interaction? Some of 
these questions have already been answered from a 
sociological, educational, anthropological, or psychological 
point of view. But until they are answered from the 
perspective of communication development, the answers will be 
incomplete. And this perspective cannot be totally valid 
unless it begins with the communication development of the 
child from birth.
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A P P E N D I X B
PATH OF CHILD'S DEVELOPMENTAL TEANSLATIONS
Scollon's (1974) example of Carroll's (1986) third 
stage is reproduced here. Probable antecedent stages are 
added to illuminate the child's translations from nonverbal 
language to verbal language as s/he matures. Given for each 
stage: 1. Known Information; 2. New Information.
First Stage (Nonverbal/Nonverbal)
1. Child waits until adult is looking at the fan.
2. Child points to the fan.
Second Stage (Nonverbal/Verbal)
1. Child points to the fan.
2. Child says, "Cool."
Third Stage (Verbal/Verbal)
1. Brenda: Fan (looking at the electric fan). Fan
Mother: Hm?
Brenda : Fan
Mother : Bathroom?
Brenda: Fan.
Mother : Fan! Yeah!
2. Brenda: Cool !
Mother: Cool, yeah. Fan makes you cool.
